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ABSTRACT 
 
The main question of this thesis is whether incumbency affiliation and political competition 
have an effect on social spending decisions of the local governments in Turkey, especially 
through strategic allocation of sub-national resources. The findings provide partial support for 
strategic fiscal choices of social spending at the local level, especially for metropolitan 
municipalities that hold partisan ties with national incumbents. While mayors that have 
partisan ties with national incumbents tend to increase spending on social assistance services 
in their stronghold provinces, they tend to spend more on health services in face of political 
competition. Moreover, electoral analysis examines the effect of particularistic social 
spending decisions on the vote share of political parties at the elections. The spending on 
health services as well as spending on social assistance increases the vote shares of political 
parties that hold mayors’ position at the national elections.   
 









YEREL DÜZEYDE SOSYAL HARCAMALARI BELĐRLEYEN 
POLĐTĐK ETMENLER: 
TÜRKĐYE’DEKĐ BÜYÜKŞEHĐR BELEDĐYELERĐ BÜTÇELERĐNĐN ĐSTATĐSTĐKĐ 
BĐR ANALĐZĐ 
 
                                                          
ÖZET 
 
Yerel yönetimlerin merkezi hükümetle siyasi partiler üzerinden bağlantısının olmasının ve 
yerel düzeyde siyasi rekabetin yerel hükümetlerin sosyal harcama kararları üzerinde etkisi var 
mıdır sorusu bu tezin başlıca sorunsalını oluşturmaktadır. Bulgular özellikle merkezi 
hükümetle partizan bağları olan büyükşehir belediyelerinin sosyal harcama yaparken stratejik 
mali kararlar aldıklarına işaret ediyor. Hükümetteki siyasi partilerle ilişkili büyükşehir 
belediye başkanları sosyal yardım harcamalarını seçmenlerin kendi partilerine olan desteğinin 
fazla olduğu illerde arttırırken, seçimlerde siyasi rekabetin yoğun olduğu yerlerde daha fazla 
sağlık harcaması yaptıkları görülüyor. Seçim analizine gore ise, sağlık ve sosyal yardım 
harcamalarının daha yüksek olduğu seçim bölgelerinde büyükşehir belediye başkanlarının 
bağlı olduğu siyasi partilerin oyları artıyor. 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Sosyal politika, sosyal harcamalar, yerel düzeyde harcamalar, mevcut 
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The comparative literature on social spending provides a prosperous understanding of 
the determinants of social expenditures. “Political parties, policy legacies and political 
institutions” are widely emphasized as explanatory factors of well functioning social policy 
mechanisms and social welfare efforts. The studies of social spending refers to durable facets 
of political institutions such as neo-corporatism, state centralization and traditionalist policy 
legacies; besides partisan and non partisan aspects of democratic politics including 
government partisanship, electoral competition and turnout, self-interested behaviors of 
politicians and bureaucrats (Keefer 2007; Hicks and Swank 1992). Especially developing 
countries provide considerable variation to examine the sources of policy decisions with 
respect to their socioeconomic and political divergences. Many studies employed an 
exhausting list of variables to understand reasons behind different levels of social spending in 
Latin American countries varying from the level of democratization, partisanship, state 
structure, openness of economy, foreign direct investment, globalization, electoral 
competition, rule of law to demographic indicators such as urban population, aged population 
as well as young (Hecock 2006; Brown and Hunter 1999; Keefer 2007; Huber, Mustillo and 
Stephens 2008).  
Social spending as a component of welfare expenditures represents a programmatic 
distribution of benefits that does not necessarily exclude particular groups in the society. 
Rather social spending aims to balance the inequalities in the society through facilitating the 
ones in need. However, social policy on the other hand provides a tool for governments that 
might increase the chances of reelection via the processes of budget allocation at the local 
level. The targeted allocation of government resources might enable particularistic exchanges 
between the political actors and their targeted clientele. Although the programmatic spending 
is determined through demographic factors, the particularistic allocation of social spending 
might encourage strategic involvement of political variables into policy-making processes. 
Despite the lack of personalistic linkages between patron and client, incumbent political 
parties are able to differentiate themselves through social spending mechanisms at the local 
governments. The local incumbents control resources that enable them to target and spend 




The particularistic allocation of resources through clientelistic linkages has been 
discussed in Turkish politics literature to characterize political arena in Turkey.1 Although 
patronage based networks are emphasized as a determinant of policy preferences of the 
governments in Turkey, the particularistic allocation of resources have not been supported by 
empirical evidence except the recent studies of Adaman and Carkoglu (2000) and 
Kemahlıoglu (2008). Moreover, other than comparative social policy analysis and the 
discussion on the extent of the social expenditures in Turkey2; the determinants of social 
spending at the local level have not been analyzed with empirical data. In this research I 
would like to fill in this gap and analyze social expenditures of metropolitan municipalities to 
understand if they are affected by political variables, in addition to demographic and 
socioeconomic determinants of programmatic spending. The research concerns the explicit 
effect of the political variables of interest that are electoral competition and incumbency 
affiliation3 in explaining the social spending decisions at the local level in Turkey between 
1997-2010.  Before presenting the results of analyses, I discuss the literatures of 
programmatic and particularistic types of spending. 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Background 
2.1.Social policy in comparative literature 
Although social expenditures are a widely used notion in the literature as well as in 
policy areas, it is hard to come up with a concordant definition of it. The public expenditures 
as a response to social demands vary with respect to their social nature by their contribution 
to the public welfare. Therefore, how to identify any public expenditure as social becomes a 
critical question. The externality, merit good aspect and coverage of the spending are 
suggested as three criteria to identify social spending (Erdogdu and Yenigun 2008). Based on 
the criteria, the social aspect of the public expenditures is related to the number of people that 
benefit from the services provided by state. Although the social services become non-
excludable and indivisible while publicly provided, the coverage is not enough to identify 
social aspect of a public expenditure. On the other hand; some of the public goods that 
emphasize particular private goods and services affect a very limited number of people, yet 
                                                           
1 Kudat 1975; Sayarı 1975 and 1977; Kalaycıoglu 1997 and 2001; Heper and Keyman 1998; Carkoglu and 
Adaman 2000; Kemahlıoglu 2008.  
2 Bugra and Adar 2007; Bugra 2007;Yenturk 2009, 2011; Erdogdu and Yenigun 2008; Seker 2011. 
3 Incumbency affiliation refers to political parties controlling local government which hold seats at the cabinet 
simultaneously. A discussion of the advantages of incumbency affiliation will be provided by sub-national 
spending literature later. 
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considered as merit goods. The good or service that concerns a particular group of people 
does not necessarily become less social. For instance, although the expenditures of merit 
goods directly influence a small part of the society, it still concerns the rest of the society as 
well. That is why the public expenditures on poor or disabled should be regarded as social 
spending. Even though there is a close relation between the coverage of a public spending 
and its social aspect, the opposite is not accurate. In other words, smaller coverage does not 
necessarily indicate a loss in social aspect of government expenditures. Another aspect that 
helps to determine the social nature of a public spending is the externality of the 
expenditures. The externality concerns the cost and benefits of an expenditure on other 
individuals who are indirectly affected from it as well. That is why an expenditure on 
education or health does not only benefit the individual who receives it, but it also contributes 
to the society (Erdogdu and Yenigun 2008).  
Besides the criteria discussed, the assumptions have a crucial role to define social 
spending due to the lack of objective measures to identify any public expenditures as social. 
It is important to notify the fact that these assumptions differ from developed countries to 
developing ones because of the discrepancies with respect to economic development and 
socio-cultural structures. For instance, in a country that resolved its infrastructural problems 
and is capable of alternative responses to possible problems, even the clean water which is a 
vital good can be easily commoditized in the market. In such a country it is not crucial to 
assess the institutions that are responsible for the provision of clean water as social. However, 
in another country where the majority does not have access to clean water and therefore the 
health of people is threatened, the service under such conditions makes the institution social, 
regardless of its cost to people. Similar to previous example, in a country with higher ratios of 
educated population; spending on especially higher education does not necessarily fall under 
the category of social. Yet on the other hand, in countries with educational deficiencies 
spending on education becomes an important component of social expenditures (Erdogdu and 
Yenigun 2008). Moreover, social expenditures do not only contribute to social welfare but 
also support the human and social capital. There is a comprehensive literature arguing the 
effect of human and social capital on economic growth and development.4 Economic growth 
and development are considered as potential sources for social welfare which is one of the 
fundamental reasons behind social spending. Although it is not possible to calculate the total 
                                                           
4 See Becker 1962; Coleman 1988; Putnam 1995; Teachman, Paasch and Carver 1997; Langhammer 1999; 
Dakhli and De Clercq 2003. 
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contribution of expenditures in human and social capital, the economic rationale suggests that 
the benefit to the society exceeds the expenditures. Therefore the expenditures that contribute 
to social and human capital need to be considered as social spending, especially in 
developing countries like Turkey (Erdogdu and Yenigun 2008).  
Besides the theoretical discussions on the extent of social expenditures, the worldwide 
applications might help to understand which expenditures should be included in an analysis 
of social spending. The three main statistical databases of social spending that are widely 
used in comparative analyses are as follows: ESSPROS (European System of Integrated 
Social Protection Statistics- EUROSTAT), SOCX (Social Expenditure Database- OECD) and 
SPERS (Social Expenditure and Performance Reviews- ILO). As Seker (2011) discusses in 
detail, the main difference among the methodologies of these databases concerns the 
definition of social risk. Accordingly, what is included in social expenditure and which 
segments of the society benefits from the social protection varies. Among many differences 
based on the extent and definition of social risks5, the inclusion of expenditures on education 
constitutes the most important difference between these three methodologies for this research. 
The methodologies of SOCX and EXPROSS do not include education expenditures into 
social budget and ignore the potential in education to decrease the poverty for the generations 
ahead. On the other hand, ILO covers the formal education as a component of social 
expenditure. In developing countries such as Turkey, the role of education should not be 
excluded from the social policy area which contributes to accumulation of human and social 
capital. Moreover, the State Planning Organization of Turkey also includes the section on 
improvement of the educational system within the ninth development plan6 that covers the 
years between 2007 and 2013 (Seker 2011). 
2.2.Explanations to social policy preferences 
The comparative literature on social spending provides a prosperous understanding 
rather than mere descriptive across different regions of the world. The amount of social 
spending and its determinants vary from OECD countries to welfare states to developing 
countries. The literature examining long established welfare states emphasizes political 
variables such like “political parties, policy legacies and political institutions” as explanatory 
                                                           
5 These differences concern the definitions of unemployment, occupational accidents, social exclusion among 
many. To see a detailed discussion see the TESEV (2011) report on monitoring the social budget in local 
governments prepared by Murat Seker. 
6 DPT 2007, IX. Development Plan 2007-2013, Ankara. 
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factors of well functioning social policy mechanisms and social welfare efforts. Those studies 
of social spending refers to durable facets of political institutions such as neo-corporatism, 
state centralization and traditionalist policy legacies; besides partisan and non partisan 
aspects of democratic politics including government partisanship, electoral competition and 
turnout, self-interested behaviors of politicians and bureaucrats (Keefer 2007; Hicks and 
Swank 1992). Among the determinants of social spending, the partisan effect is mostly 
referred since the social spending is commonly associated with left-wing parties.7 Therefore, 
the expectation towards higher levels of social spending from a left-wing government 
dominates the arguments in the literature. As an interesting contribution to the studies on the 
effect of partisanship, Jensen (2010) argues that the partisan effects are not uniform across 
western world but depends on the existing welfare setup in the countries. Accordingly, a 
right-wing government might unexpectedly spend more in a country where left wing 
governments have a long established tradition to compensate for the distrust on right wing 
parties regarding social spending.  
Although OECD welfare states as old established democracies represent a well 
functioning social policy, the variation among those countries remains weak to examine the 
sources of policy decisions, including social spending. That is why the literature recently 
converged on the Latin American and East Asian states as crucial parts of the developing 
world which provide considerable variation within the political and socio-economic 
variables. Many studies employed an exhausting list of variables to understand reasons 
behind different levels of social spending in Latin American countries varying from the level 
of democratization, partisanship, state structure, openness of economy, foreign direct 
investment, globalization, electoral competition, rule of law to demographic indicators such 
as urban population, aged population as well as young (Hecock 2006; Brown and Hunter 
1999; Keefer 2007; Huber, Mustillo and Stephens 2008). 
The variation within the region depends on the size and the coverage of the welfare 
state. How regime type contributed to these differences in social policy becomes a key 
question for many studies. 8  Haggard and Kaufman (2008) emphasize the discrepancies 
between democracies including some semi-democracies and competitive authoritarian 
regimes, and their hard authoritarian counterparts in terms of the expansion of social policies 
                                                           
7 Korpi and Palme 1998; Huber and Stephens 2001; Iversen and Stephens 2008; Bradley et al 2003; Iversen and 
Soskice 2006. 
8 Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Brown and Hunter 1999; Huber, Mustillo and Stephens 2008. 
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in areas of social security, health and the access to education. The duration of democratic rule 
also matters to distinguish comprehensive opportunities “for the mobilization of parties and 
interest groups that appeal to low-income sectors and greater possibilities for the cumulative 
growth of social commitments” the long-standing democracies offer compared to countries in 
which democratization were either partial or of shorter duration (Haggard and Kaufman 
2008). Moreover, the involvement of unions and populist political movement into the 
decision making processes significantly shaped the social welfare system in Latin America 
from the initial stages of democratization, although the integration into the system was very 
limited and controlled at the beginning (Haggard and Kaufman 2008).     
Besides Latin America, the comparative literature on East Asia suggests a very 
different pattern of social policy for the region. Mostly discussed within the framework of 
Esping-Andersen's (1990) 'worlds of welfare capitalism', the literature considers the East 
Asian experience as a distinctive form of welfare system from Euro-American models in 
social policy discourse that cannot be fitted properly into the conservative-liberal-social 
democratic tripartite (Kwon 2005; Holliday 2000). Although there is no agreement on the 
precise nature of East Asian experience9, the recent studies mostly focus on developmental 
aspects of political development to discuss 'East Asian welfare regime' (Aspalter 2006). 
According to Midgley (1995) and Tang (2000), the governments believe in the theory that the 
economic growth will eventually benefit all of the population. Therefore, the states of East 
Asia with a developmental focus applied government intervention and promoted 
industrialization through policies. According to Tang (2000); “small governmental spending, 
relatively flexible labor markets and the application of social security as an instrument to 
target politically important interest groups” are the common characteristics of East Asian 
developmental states. Although it is inconvenient to discuss all East Asian countries as an 
integrity, especially in mature economies of East Asia the social policies are subordinated to 
economic policy and worth applying as long as they encourage “economic growth, political 
stability, social peace and human capital development” (Holliday 2000).  
The regime type is emphasized as an important political determinant in this region as 
well. In East Asia, overall incidence of democracy is lower and duration of particular 
democracies are shorter compared to other parts of developing world such as Latin America 
(Haggard and Kaufman 2008). The incidence of competitive politics that might influence the 
                                                           
9 To follow the development of East Asian welfare literature, see Jones 1993; Midgley 1986, 1995; Tang 2000; 
Holliday 2000; Gough and Barrientos 2004. 
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policy making process is not a common observation within the region. 10  Although the 
democratic openings were accompanied by shifts in government priorities and expansion of 
social insurance as well as services in general, the regime types prevented major changes on 
social policy area (such as market reform and social development) in East Asia. Except 
Singapore and Malaysia that inherited central provident funds11 and public health systems 
from British legacy, the governments with authoritarian history generally take a minimalist 
approach to social policy. The model of East Asian social policy suggests minimal 
government fiscal commitment and almost no redistribution, and the health systems became 
more market oriented over time (Haggard and Kaufman 2008).   
Apart from the emerging literatures on different regions, Haggard and Kaufman 
(2008) compare the welfare efforts across Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe. 
Although the welfare state is mostly associated with Northern-Western European states, the 
regional welfare models are also developed in Latin America as well as East Asia and Eastern 
Europe with a varying focus of emphasis between the provision of social insurance, basic 
health services and education. Briefly, social security spending in Latin America statistically 
exceeds the East Asian minimalist welfare states' spending on pensions both as a percentage 
of GDP and share of government spending. Moreover, the variation in health spending is not 
significant across regions. However, Latin American governments put greater emphasis on 
social insurance compared to Asian ones, which give weight to basic health care. On the 
other hand, despite the lower per-capita income in general, Asian countries spent more on 
education as a share of GDP and government spending than did the East European countries; 
while the differences in educational spending between East Asia and Latin America are not 
significant (Haggard and Kaufman 2008). 12  Haggard and Kaufman (2008) explain these 
cross-regional differences by political economy factors that include “critical realignments, the 
choice of development strategy and regime type” as well as varying dimensions of economic 
and social divergences across regions.  
2.3.Is welfare spending still relevant in context of globalization? 
                                                           
10 Haggard and Kaufman (2008) give Philippines and Malaysia as limited examples of democracy that 
influenced policy making processes. 
11 CPF (Central Provident Fund) is a compulsory provident savings plan for national workers primarily to fund 
their retirement, healthcare and housing needs. See Aspalter 2006 for further discussion. 
12 pp. 40 
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Despite the development of regional models, the relevance of welfare states is highly 
debated especially in context of globalization.13 On the one hand Mosley (2000) argues that 
there is still “room to move” with respect to the divergence on policies of industrialized 
countries, despite the pressures of international financial markets on policy choices of 
governments. The motivations are rooted in domestic institutions and politics as a result of 
which the governments have opportunity to maintain their welfare policies, despite the 
international financialization of markets. On the other there are several studies that based 
their arguments on the decline of the welfare state in different parts of the world.14 
Rudra (2002) is one of the scholars who argue that the welfare spending decisions of 
developed and developing countries have diverged. While more developed countries 
increased their resources to spend on public welfare provision, developing countries 
decreased their welfare expenditures as a share of their average GDP. Rudra (2002) explains 
these diverging trends in welfare spending with respect to the collective-action capability of 
workers in face of globalization that undermines labor's potential to strike in LDCs where 
low-skilled labor is highly abundant. Moreover, based on comparative evidence Mishra 
(1999) argues that as globalization maintains its present neoliberal path, pressures on West 
European and Japanese social market models -as alternatives to Anglo-Saxon model US 
represents- “to deregulate and lower social standards” will escalate. The study claims that the 
opening up of economies restricted the policy autonomy of nation states particularly on 
“labor markets, taxation, social spending and systems of social protection” as well as 
undermining the defense against poverty. Hence, Mishra (1999) emphasizes the need for a 
“transnational approach to social policy and social standards as an alternative to current 
system of capitalism and maintenance of welfare policy”. Razin and Sadka (2005) employs a 
political economy model that assess the impact of the globalization which combines the 
forces of aging, low-skill migration as well as globalization itself. The interpretations of the 
model suggest that the forces are too strong for the welfare state to maintain its current size. 
Moreover, they emphasize the recent adjustments in retirement ages across a variety of 
                                                           
13 See Bernauer and Achini 2000; Iversen and Cusack 2000; Hicks 1999; Rieger and Leibfried 1998; Garrett 
2001; Rodrik 1998; Pierson 1996. 
14 See Rudra 2002; Mishra 1999; Razin and Sadka 2005; Greve 2006. 
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industrialized economies15, including United States, France and Germany as an evidence of 
the tendency to restrict welfare-state programs.   
Although the OECD declared that the welfare state was in crisis in 198116, European 
welfare system seems to survive and even enhance its impact through increases in social 
security spending and coverage of spending between EU states. However, recent debates of 
reforms on the pension systems that aim “ensuring later retirement from the labor market and 
increased the use of the market” indicate a tendency towards a current crisis of welfare state 
(Greve 2006). Moreover, Greve (2006) also contributes to the discussion on the decreasing 
capacity of nation state to maintain its own national strategy. Greve (2006) accepts that the 
“room for maneuver” within the nation state particularly in income and fiscal policies has 
been shrinking, especially for small open economies and autonomous decision making is not 
an option in these policy areas for Euro-zone anymore.     
As oppose to the arguments on the decline of the welfare state in context of 
globalization, the analysis of Pierson (1996) claims that the support of the powerful interest 
groups to the welfare state in Europe prevented a drastic decline in functionality of the 
welfare state. The social spending is considered as inflexible or inelastic because of its nature. 
Although the expenditures of governments are expected to decrease following globalization, 
social spending continues to capture a considerable share from the budgets according to 
empirics (Pierson 1996; Bugra and Adar 2007). Although the total public expenditures as a 
share of GDP dropped in OECD countries from the mid-1980s to the second half 1990s, the 
public social expenditures did not decline and the argument is also valid between the years 
1980-2003 as well (Bugra and Adar 2007). 
While discussing the effect of globalization, the relationship between openness and 
social spending is at stake. There is an extant literature on this relationship with a variety of 
arguments that support both negative and positive ties between openness and social 
spending.17 One strand of the literature expects an increased openness to lead governments to 
decrease public spending, according to the efficiency hypothesis. Rudra (2002, 2005) 
suggests the governments to spend less on a host of goods and services in order to reduce the 
                                                           
15 US gradually raises the retirement age so that it will be 67 by the year 2027. France decided to increase the 
years that public sector workers are required to contribute to state pension system. Germany who has already 
incresed the retirement age decided to increase it again to 67 between 2011 and 2035. (Razin and Sadka, 2005) 
16 OECD 1981, Welfare State in Crisis. Available online at http://img.kb.dk/tidsskriftdk/pdf/nto/nto_0120-
PDF/nto_0120_89499.pdf 
17 See Rudra 2002 and 2005; Segura- Ubiergo 2001; Adsera and Boix 2002; Nooruddin and Simmons 2009. 
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price of intermediate and consumer goods as well as labor by guaranteeing the 
competitiveness of prices vis-a-vis imports in the market through exchange rate. Moreover, 
Garrett and Mitchell (2001) associate decreases in government spending with increases in 
total trade and international financial openness, although the economies with greater 
openness (i.e. greater inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment) continues to tax the 
capital heavily. In contrast, other studies expect to observe an increase in government 
spending when an economy opens up. Two arguments support the expectation for 
governments to increase spending as a result of opening. First, the social spending is 
suggested as a tool for governments to win the support of public for the neoliberal policies of 
government, in order to compensate for the potential harm through loss of jobs and lack of 
competitive markets. According to Rodrik (1998), governments of more open economies 
which have greater exposure to the risks of global markets spend more to support the “safe” 
public sector. Second, an increase in public spending through investment in human capital 
might lead to an increase in worker skills and therefore productivity (Kaufman and Segura- 
Ubiergo 2001). 
Instead of arguing an unconditional relation between openness and spending, the 
literature responds to various questions on the effect of political and institutional variables on 
spending as well as interactions between these variables and trade openness. While Adsera 
and Boix (2002) refers to regime type as a determinant of government spending “to 
accommodate public demands for compensation”, Nooruddin and Simmons (2009) focus on 
democracies' response to openness by increasing social spending to make it more acceptable 
because of the economic insecurities and dislocations it generated. Moreover, Rudra and 
Haggard (2005) find evidence on autocracies spending less in the face of openness, while 
democracies do not represent a particular pattern towards spending more by higher levels of 
trade openness according to their results that challenge the arguments by Kaufman and 
Segura- Ubiergo (2001) and Avelino et al. (2005) to an extent. Besides, many studies18 
examine the impact of domestic political institutions on public service spending under higher 
exposure to international trade and mobile capital. The evidence for contrary results exists. 
In a sample of 14 Latin American countries, Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) 
find that globalization produces downward pressure on social security but less so for 
education and health-care spending (pp. 554–55). They also find that democracies do not cut 
                                                           
18 Kaufman and Segura- Ubiergo 2001; Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; Rudra and Haggard 2005. 
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welfare expenditures in the face of openness, and spend more on health and education 
compared to non-democracies. Analyzing a similar set of countries, Avelino, Brown, and 
Hunter (2005) report that ‘‘trade openness has a strong positive impact on the resources 
devoted to education and social security while democracy’s impact on spending results from 
increased expenditures for education” (Avelino, Brown and Hunter 2005, p. 626). 
The prosperity of research on the relationship between globalization and spending 
provides a comprehensive understanding on the question. Although the effect of globalization 
on welfare expenditures such as social security, education and health-care spending remains 
inconclusive; the abundance of research implies the relevance of welfare spending in the 
literature, despite and through globalization.     
2.4.Social Policy in Turkey 
The recent studies make considerable effort to determine the extent of social 
expenditure in Turkey19 and the common measures to identify any expenditure as social 
emerges as follows. The positive externalities, the benefits of particular disadvantaged groups 
in the society and the coverage of the spending turn out to be most important aspects of any 
social expenditure in Turkey, in line with the comparative literature. Accordingly, the 
expenditures that help improving social welfare conditions and contribute to the development 
of human and social capital are included in social budget. 
The social spending consists of the social assistance services, health services and 
education services based on their functional classifications in the budget throughout this 
research.20 Seker (2011) also includes spending on education, health and social protection 
into the public sector social expenditures in Turkey. With respect to their description under 
functional classification, what each component of social spending covers is as follows. Social 
assistance services include social security and social protection services for those who do not 
receive regular social security benefits; payments to old, disabled and ill as well as direct 
transfers of social assistance. Health services include health services of government, 
formation and implementation of public health facilities, services of public health and 
                                                           
19 To follow recent publications on social expenditures in Turkey, see Bugra’s (2007) Turkiye'nin Sosyal 
Koruma Harcamalari ,Yenturk’s (2009) Sosyal Koruma Harcamalarini Izleme Klavuzu and Erdogdu and 
Yenigun’s (2008) Turkiye'de Sosyal Butce. 
20 A series of descriptive graphs (based on the data collected for the analysis) is provided in the appendix that 




services of outpatient care. Finally, education services refer to operation of the schools of 
each degree, foundation and supervision of them, services of formal and mass education. 
(Yentürk 2011, p. 36) Moreover, according to the guide for analytical classification of 
budgetary expenditures, spending on education services cover scholarships and allowances 
for students and interns both in Turkey and abroad, participation of personnel to vocational 
training programs as well as other transfers for expenditures of registration, diploma, 
examinations or certificates for the students in need.21 
The public social spending is considerably low in Turkey compared to other OECD 
countries, including South European countries that used to have a similar welfare system to 
Turkey before their full membership to EU. Unlike Turkey, these Southern European 
countries increased their public social spending significantly (Bugra and Adar 2007). 
According to SOCX methodology in 2003, the public social spending is 11.6 percent as a 
share of GDP in Turkey. The OECD average turns out to be 20.7 percent for the same year. 
Moreover, the comparative data from ESSPROS covering the years from 2002 to 2004 
suggests that the social protection expenditures in Turkey are around 12.5 percent of GDP. 
The same ratio is 27.6 for EU-15 area countries, and 26 for Greece, 24.9 for Portugal, and 20 
for Spain in year 2004. If the expenditures on social protection excluding the old age 
assistance and spending on health are considered, the weakness of Turkey in social policy 
area becomes clearer. Social spending under the category of “others” constitutes the 1.3 
percent of GDP in Turkey, while this number reaches to 7.2 percent for EU-15. These 
statistics indicate the necessity in Turkey to increase the resources directed to poverty and 
social exclusion through income support programs or unemployment insurance and support 
for housing (Bugra and Adar 2007).  
Bugra and Adar suggest a new welfare model called “welfare governance”22 which 
reflects on Turkey as well. One of the most important aspects of this model concerns the 
transition of the responsibilities from central mechanisms to local governments with respect 
to the provision of social assistance. The emphasis on local governments contributes to the 
validity and relevance of the analysis in this research that is based on the metropolitan 
municipalities in Turkey. Another important aspect of the “welfare governance” as a new 
form of welfare provision is the cooperation between public institutions and private sector in 
                                                           
21 The guide of analytical budgetary classification for Đstanbul Metropolitan municipality is provided by Melek 
Yonca as the assistant director of budget on 25 November 2011. 
22 “Refah yonetisim” as it is referred in the original text. 
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a way that emphasizes the integration of civil society into the process. Although the role of 
nongovernmental organizations are not in the scope of this research23, the concerns on the 
states’ control over standardization and continuance of social services worth notice under the 
circumstances that encourage the withdrawal of state from the process. Moreover, this new 
approach to welfare provision that highlights the role of civil organizations is compatible 
with the traditional approach that perceives social services as charitable endowment instead 
of the responsibility of state (Bugra and Adar 2007).   
Especially from the beginning of 1980s, the policies that encourage a diminishing 
welfare state shifted the focus on local governments and expanded their role on public 
welfare provision. The contribution of local governments to social policy varies between 
countries as well as time periods. The local governments’ functions to provide economic 
stability, income distribution and public services mostly failed to achieve the first two of 
these goals both in developed 24  and developing 25  countries (Ersoz 2011). The foremost 
purpose of local governments has become to provide public services either as local 
representatives of central government or as colleagues, since legal regulations to improve 
working conditions and income redistribution compel a decision making process at the 
national level, instead of distinct regional policies. However, the local governments embody a 
considerable portion of the public sector employment in their departments in most of the 
developed countries. Therefore, these local institutions might lead the enrichments in social 
policy through improvements in collective bargaining agreements. In other words, although 
local governments’ main function concentrated more on public service provision, their 
capabilities is not limited to it (Ersoz 2011).   
Although the neoliberal policies of post-1980 governments in the world highly 
influenced the social and economic policies of Turkey, the tendency to restrict the financial 
resources and aids of local governments received from center did not reflect on Turkey. 
Contrary to the trends in liberal countries, the financial resources of municipalities increased 
between 1981 and 1994 through law regulations in Turkey. Up until the crisis of 1994, the 
financial resources directed to municipalities remained above the average share from central 
                                                           
23 For further discussion on the role of NGOs in welfare provision, see World Bank 1997 and 2000; Jessop 
1999; Bode 2006; Tendler 2004; Chandhoke 2002. 
24 Owens and Norregaard 1991. 
25 Smoke 2000. 
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budget income.26 The revisions on the economic policy aimed to increase the public revenues 
while decreasing public expenditures. The decisions of April 5th decreased the revenues of 
municipalities through changes in tax law in order to balance the budget. Aftermath of the 
new regulations, the municipalities experienced difficulties in investment and even the 
monthly payments of personnel until the amendments after 2004 that increased the share of 
tax revenues transferred from the central budget. Despite these increases, the financial 
independence of municipality budgets remains as a problem. In fact, the share of local 
government revenues within public revenues as one of the determinants of financial 
independence is quite low compared to developed countries. Among OECD countries, the 
ratio of local government revenues to public revenues is 25.4 % on average; while this ratio is 
12.97% for Turkey. A considerable part of local budget consists of transfers, private funds 
and shares from the tax revenues of central budget27, while tax revenues of local governments 
corresponds to 14.3% of the budget. The figures reflect the dependency of local budget to the 
center, besides the insufficiency of financial resources (Ersoz 2011, pp. 113-116). 
The Law Number 5216 specifies the responsibilities and the boundaries of jurisdiction 
for the metropolitan municipalities. Within the scope of administrative reforms that aimed to 
transform local governments into effective agents of local services in 2004, the Law Number 
5216 defines social policy among the responsibilities of metropolitan municipalities. The 
municipal law determines the extent of social policy in local governments and responsibilities 
attached to governors at the local level. The content of the municipal law is comprehensive 
and compasses social assistance and social services as well as particular services provided for 
disadvantaged population in the society. The law encourages local governments to promote 
social policy through the services that emphasize the population under social policy coverage 
(Ersoz 2011, p. 135). The social policy functions of metropolitan municipalities include 
services of basic social policy areas of education, health and residence; poverty centric 
services such as social assistance services for old, disabled, unprotected children, women and 
family; and broader services with a focus on women, young, disabled population (p. 159). 
2.5.Programmatic versus Particularistic Spending 
                                                           
26 According to Guler (1994), while municipalities shared 8.81% of the budget income on average between 
1925-1989; this share increased to 9.51% in 1985 and to 17.02% in 1986 which is the highest share in 
republican history. 
27 The ratio was around 53% for municipalities between 2000-2003.  
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A variety of research questions particularly tackle with sub-national spending with 
respect to macroeconomic stability especially in developing countries 28  and institutional 
framework that influences the fiscal decisions29. The literature on sub-national government 
expenditures frequently uses political variables such as political competition and incumbency 
affiliation to understand the mechanisms behind spending decisions of both central and local 
governments. 
The partisan affiliation of local governments with the national incumbents especially 
in federal governments emerged as a new strand in the literature. Accordingly, the partisan 
ties with the national incumbents are expected to decrease the total sub-national spending at 
the local level, controlling for the size of the revenue30. The fundamental reasons concern the 
macroeconomic stability and then chances of reelection most of the time. The budgetary 
tensions due to deficits and debt levels that threaten the macroeconomic stability might lead 
central governments to restrict spending at the local level in order to increase the chances of 
the reelection at the national level. That is why the expectation towards a decrease in 
spending at the local governments that are affiliated with the national incumbent dominates 
the literature on local partisan ties. However the patronage literature expects an increase in 
spending levels at the local governments that are affiliated with the national incumbents. The 
arguments suggest that the mechanisms of favor distribution expand the amount of spending 
in local governments with partisan ties which already receive more resources from the center 
compared to others that are not affiliated with the national incumbents.31 If the co-partisans of 
national incumbents at the lower levels of government receive more resources, the 
expectation towards co-partisans to involve more in particularistic distribution of benefits at 
the local level increases. It means that the partisan ties will enable the incumbent affiliated 
mayors that choose to take advantage of particularistic networks through disproportionate 
access to government resources. Accordingly, the expectations via two different strands of 
literature suggest a two-sided analysis of the effect of incumbency advantage on spending 
decisions. 
Another strand of the literature focuses on the effect of electoral competition on the 
fiscal choices of governments, including spending as well as social spending in particular. 
                                                           
28 Remmer and Wibbels 2000; Jones et. al. 2000; Khemani 2002; Kemahlioglu 2009. 
29 Alt and Lowry 1994; Merrifield 2000. 
30 Kemahlioglu (2009) differentiates Brazil as an exception to this tendency. 
31 See Wright 1974; Grossman 1994; Worthingon and Dollary 1998; Travits 2009; Roszvitch and Weiss 1993 to 
follow the literature concerning the effect of partisan ties on intergovernmental grants and transfers.  
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Many outstanding studies examined the effect of democracy on social spending as the focus 
of the literature shifted from the industrialized counties to developing world.32 The studies 
emphasize the expectation towards higher levels of spending on popular programs in 
democratic regimes in order to increase the chances in the elections compared to authoritarian 
ones. Apart from the comparison between democratic and authoritarian regimes, more studies 
examine the effect of electoral competition on spending decision across democracies as well 
as at the sub-national level.33 Comiskey (1993) tackles with the question concerning the 
effect of democratic competition on the public spending across industrialized democracies. 
The results of Comiskey (1993) suggest a positive linkage between indicators of electoral 
competition and the growth of domestic spending. 34  However the effect of political 
competition on spending decisions or clientelistic efforts are dependent upon other factors 
most of the time. Barrilleaux, Holbrook and Langer (2002) examine the role of electoral 
competition as well as its interaction with the partisan composition of the legislature in 
American states' public policy making. Within the literature there is a tendency towards the 
expectation that more rewards should be given to the supporters whenever the competition is 
tighter.35 Therefore more political competition is expected to result in policy outcomes which 
support “more generous provision of services and benefits from governments” (Barrilleaux, 
Holbrook and Langer 2002). However the results from Barrilleaux, Holbrook and Langer 
(2002) interestingly indicate that the partisan composition in the legislature (whether 
legislature is composed by Democrats or Republicans) matters to the decision of welfare 
spending in the face of electoral competition. While the level of competition is associated 
with greater welfare spending in a legislature under the control of Democrats, the same 
impact does not occur for Republican legislatures (Barrilleaux, Holbrook and Langer 2002). 
Similarly, Weitz-Shapiro (2012) argues that the effect of political competition on the 
clientelistic efforts of mayors is only significant in regions with higher levels of poverty.  
Moreover, the literature on particularistic spending on core voters versus swing voters 
enables me to discuss the effect of political competition on social spending better. The debate 
continues on how political parties allocate their resources, especially private and public 
targetable goods to either increase or optimize their electoral chances. While one strand in the 
literature base their arguments on “core voter model” of Cox and McCubbins (1986), the 
                                                           
32 Brown and Hunter 1999, 2004; Kaufman and Segura- Ubiergo 2001; Stasavage 2005. 
33 See Hecock 2006; Comiskey 1993; Barrilleaux, Holbrook and Langer 2002; Hicks and Swank 1992. 
34 The significant relationship corresponds to years from 1950 to 1973 and 1973 to 1983. 
35 Schattschneider 1942; Riker 1962; Schlesinger 1991.   
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opponents develop their claims on the “swing voter model” of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). 
Based on the models, the political parties either distribute or promise to distribute targetable 
goods to either core or swing voters. The empirical studies on core voters suggest that the 
political parties’ incentive to target loyal voters is based on their strategy to maximize their 
votes. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2003), Levitt and Snyder (1995), Balla et al. (2002), Diaz-
Cayeros et al. (2000), Murillo and Calvo (2004) and Bickers and Stein (2000) lead the 
empirical studies on targeting core voters across and within electoral districts. These studies 
expect political parties to involve in particular distribution of benefits as a rewarding 
mechanism in their stronghold districts. On the other hand; Wright (1974), Bickers and Stein 
(1996), Denemark (2000), Herron and Theodos (2004), Stokes (2005) 36 , Dahlberg and 
Johansson (2002), and Case (2001) outstand as the empirical studies examining the allocation 
of benefits in favor of the swing voters. The political parties might strategically distribute 
more on districts with voters that might change their vote depending upon what they receive 
or when they are promised to receive.  The cross-district studies provide evidence on political 
parties targeting districts with swing voters, even though they do not answer the question on 
exactly who gets the benefits in each district. Accordingly, political parties might target areas 
with either loyal or swing voters with respect to different motives.  
Finally, in provinces where political competition is tighter, the political parties at the 
local government might tend to increase their spending. Higher levels of social spending in 
those provinces with swing voters might benefit the mayors and the political parties that are 
affiliated with them in the elections. The literature on patronage politics expects an increase 
in local incumbents’ social spending through particularistic allocation of resources towards 
swing voters, in face of political competition.    
Based on the discussions of incumbency affiliation and political competition, this 
research will examine the effect of political variables as well as their interaction on the social 
spending decisions of mayors at the local level in Turkey. Apart from the incumbency 
affiliation and political competition, their interaction helps to understand whether political 
competition effects the social spending decisions of mayors with partisan ties differently, 
compared to the local governments that are not affiliated with the national incumbents. The 
empirical analysis focuses on the social spending, regarding the arguments of spending in 
general. The aim is to understand the effect of political variables on social spending in 
                                                           
36 Among the studies mentioned, only Stokes (2005) examines the allocation of benefit to individual voters 
insted of districts.   
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particular, since social expenditures concern welfare improvement and therefore attributed as 
inflexible. However, the variation within social spending across metropolitan municipalities 
is expected to be responsive to political variables of interest as well. 
Moreover, the literature of voting behavior incorporates the effect of social policy 
preferences into the determinants of voting behavior. Although income based voting has been 
a mainstay of the literature, different perspectives to understand voting behavior towards 
redistributive policies of governments in particular exist in the literature.37 The arguments on 
income based voting concentrates on redistributive policies and its effect on voters’ attitudes. 
The discussion develops around the effect of inequality on the redistributive preferences of 
median voter based on the 'tax and transfer' model of Meltzer and Richard (1981) that studies 
the relationship between income distributions and taxes. The main argument emerges from 
the discussion is that the “redistribution should be highest in polities with the highest levels 
of inequality, because in such societies, the median voter has the most to gain from taxes that 
redistribute income” (Huber and Stanig 2009). However, many studies claimed that the 
redistributive programs do not respond to levels of inequality38, contrary to intuitive appeal of 
the argument based on the 'tax and transfer' model. Despite the diversity of models that 
examine a wide range of factors 39  that might affect taxes and distribution (besides the 
unsettled discussion on inequality), the arguments are based on a common assumption that 
accepts “voters will support parties that advance their economic interest”, all else equal 
(Huber and Stanig 2009). Accordingly, poor is expected to vote for redistributive policies 
while the support for the leftist “tax and transfer” parties decreases with increasing income at 
the individual level (Lipset et al. 1954).  
Although the literature mostly emphasize the influence of redistributive policies, the 
social spending as a part of the social policy might have an effect on the voting decisions of 
electorate as well. Bruhn (1996) argues that the national solidarity program in Mexico which 
selectively targets groups in order to avoid large-scale subsidies resulted in the increase of 
PRI’s political support. Although the increase in PRI votes cannot be solely attributed to the 
                                                           
37 Huber and Stanig (2009) focus on the macro level variables that are related to ethnic heterogeneity, cross 
pressures on individual freedom issues, economic development, electoral laws and party systems to examine 
their effect on the relationship between individual income and vote choice. Among those macro level variables, 
Iversen and Soskice (2006) also emphasize the influence of electoral law on the vote choice in order to 
understand why some democracies redistribute more than others. 
38 See Alesina and Glaeser 2006; Moene and Wallerstein 2001; Benabou 1996. 
39 The literature is vast and diverse, and includes many variables ranging from electoral laws, targeted transfers, 
social insurance schemes to policy dimensions unrelated to redistribution (Huber and Stanig 2009). 
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social program they adopted, the perception of “personally benefitted from program” 
emerged among significant determinants of PRI vote in the polls (Bruhn 1996). Based on the 
effect of social policy programs on voting behavior, the final part of the analysis tries to 
understand if vote share of political parties that involve in particularistic social spending 
benefit from their strategic allocation of social expenditures at the local level in Turkey. 
The literature on political clientelism is diverse and still expanding. The comparative 
literature on political clientelism employs a wide range of measures including government 
expenditures, personnel spending, allocation of investment subsidies as well as public 
investment and distribution of jobs to understand the relationship between patrons and 
clients. According to Lemarchand and Legg’s (1972) definition, clientelism refers to “an 
individual, affective and reciprocal relationship” between an inferior and a superior who have 
access to unequal resources. Robinson and Verdier (2001) suggest a common conclusion that 
clientelistic politics are most attractive in conditions of low productivity, high inequality and 
long established hierarchical social relations; while other strands of the literature emphasize 
the importance of culture, economic development, historical legacy and the size of the public 
welfare sector (Wantchekon 2003). It is necessary to discuss clientelism within the scope of 
this research in order to understand the mechanisms that lead to particularistic distribution of 
government resources at the local level. Although social spending substantially refers to 
social policy literature, the correlates and linkages that are suggested by clientelism and 
patronage literatures enhance the answers given in a discussion of government expenditures, 
including social spending.  
An early work of Scott (1969) describes the political machine as rather a non-
ideological organization that relies on “what it accomplishes in a concrete way for its 
supporters, not on what it stands for”. This approach allows scholars to examine the 
relationship between patron and his/her clientele beyond the ideological and institutional 
mechanisms. Political or institutional legacies such as ideological tendency, party 
identification, party system or electoral law remain insufficient to explain the preferences of 
voters, especially in developing countries where informal mechanisms are prevalent. The 
under institutionalization in developing countries encourages the accommodation of 
clientelistic networks or patronage based relations. However, under institutionalization does 
not provide an understanding of informal political mechanisms; unless they are studied 
separately and in depth, rather than identifying them as under institutionalized compared to 
their institutionalized counterparts (O'Donnel 1996). The informal linkages help to explain 
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the mechanisms that cannot be explained by the variables of developed country literatures. 
Hence, a wide-ranging literature on informal or partially informal political mechanisms leads 
and encourages the students of politics to search for alternative explanations.  
Many studies respond to the questions of clientelism with respect to their research 
interest ranging from the type of voters that are targeted by clientelism40 to the reasons why 
patrons and clients “comply with clientelistic agreements”41, as well as “the implications of 
clientelism for democratic accountability” 42  (Weitz-Shapiro 2012). Moreover, Calvo and 
Murillo (2004) respond to the question why some incumbents are more likely to benefit from 
patronage politics than others. Besides, a comperehensive study of Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
(2007) place policy choice of the governments at the center of the analysis on linkages 
between patrons and their clientele. However, Weitz-Shapiro (2012) emphasizes that only 
few studies search for an answer to the substantial question that asks why some political 
agents choose to involve in clientelistic networks while others do not, at the first place. In her 
research, Weitz-Shapiro (2012) suggests the interaction of political competition and poverty 
as the key determinant of the involvement into personalized decision making in a context 
where clientelism is widespread. Asking the question “why some individual politicians use 
clientelism while others opt not to” as Weitz-Shapiro (2012) did becomes very crucial, in 
order to understand the extent of clientelistic practices and political correlates that encourage 
particularistic distribution of resources in return for political support. This research also aims 
to explain the correlates of particularistic decision making43 in regards to the variation within 
social spending decisions of local governments in Turkey. 
The literature on political clientelism and patronage in Turkey implies established 
particularistic networks. However, most of the arguments are not supported by empirics 
except the recent studies of Carkoglu and Adaman (2000, 2001) and Kemahlioglu (2008). 
Carkoglu and Adaman in a series of TESEV reports based on a comprehensive survey data 
examine the household views in Turkey regarding the satisfaction from the services of central 
and local mechanisms of government; patronage based relationships as well as the causes of 
corruption and preventive measures suggested. Besides, Kemahlioglu (2008) concerns the 
                                                           
40 Gans-Morse et al. 2009, Nitcher 2008, Stokes 2005, Stokes and Dunning 2008. 
41 Auyero 2000, Lawson 2009, Brusco et al. 2004, Stokes 2005. 
42 Piattoni 2001, Stokes 2007. 
43 Although it is not possible to detect a clientelistic transaction (or call it as clientelism) from the examination 
of final accounts of metropolitan municipalities with statistical analysis, the reference to clientelism literature is 
still necessary to understand the motivation behind the research on political variables that might explain the 
variation within social spending. 
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particularistic distribution of investment subsidies in provinces where the vote share of 
coalition partners decrease in line with their capacity to claim any responsibility for 
particularistic provision of goods.     
Earlier theoretical arguments concentrate on the establishment and characteristics of 
networks and changing nature of the relationships after economic development followed by 
social transformation in Turkey. Kudat (1975) suggests that these interpersonal or non-formal 
relations of influence are central to an analysis of interest articulation in Turkey, especially 
for eastern local politics of less developed regions. Throughout the analysis, Kudat (1975) 
refers to these relations as either “clientelism”, “dyadic contract” or “personal network”. The 
study establishes a framework based on “a mixed system” between formal central authority, 
bureaucracy and informal local, personalistic ties (Kudat, 1975, p. 66). Moreover, face to face 
relations of a dyadic nature and involving parties of unequal status are identified as the 
essential characteristics of personalized networks in Turkey. Hence, the early literature 
suggests a vertical relationship based on exchange of goods and services between the agents 
of a clientelistic network, especially based on the studies of the eastern regions of Turkey. 
Within the scope of a vertical relationship based on patronage, patron usually provided 
“protection and benefits” while the client supplied “personal services, loyalty, assistance and 
general support”. The resources provided by the patrons consist of two types; either direct or 
indirect. While the direct resources of patrons correspond to an easier access to land, work, 
scholarship or funds; the indirect sources refer to the strategic contact with other people who 
have direct control over the resources concerned (Kudat, 1975, pp. 66-67). 
With regard to the emphasis on the eastern Turkey, understanding the reasons why 
personalized networks developed in the region becomes essential to the development of 
literature. Why patrons rather than formal political organizations became prevalent in 
particular regions of Turkey? Kudat (1975) suggests a variety of reasons to reflect the 
environment in eastern Turkey that encouraged the establishment of personalized networks, 
including “ethnic and religious cleavages, widespread poverty and economic dependence of 
the population, fragmentation of political power and inability of the state to reach the eastern 
countryside” (Kudat, 1975, p. 73-74). 
In line with the transformation of the socio-economic dynamics following the rapid 
social mobilization from 1970s to 1990s, the networks based on personalized relationships 
also changed. The transformation of party notables into party-affiliated brokers enabled the 
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development of party patronage rather than the patron dominated relationships (Sayari 1975, 
1977; Kalaycioglu 1995). The emphasis on rural patrons shifted to the “dual alliance of 
politicians and public bureaucrats” (Kalaycioglu 1995). In contrast to the dependency on one 
particular patron, clients expanded their access to resources through greater opportunities of 
choosing between several competing brokers (Huizer 1965). Hence, the multiplicity of the 
opportunities increased the bargaining power of the clients- both the peasants in rural areas 
and the new residents of shantytowns in the city (Sayari 1975, 1977). Consequently, the 
transformation of socio-economic dynamics in Turkey -especially through increased migrant 
population in cities- shifted the focus on “urban party patronage” rather than person based 
relations of particularistic networks (Sayari 1975, 1977).       
On the other hand, Heper and Keyman (1998) approach the historical evolution of 
patronage politics in Turkey via “tensions between state elite and party elite after multi party 
politics”. The measures of protection served as the means of requirements of economic 
modernization throughout the “westernization period” controlled by the state elite which 
represents a strong state tradition. Contrary to state elite, political elite tended to be 
responsive to the demands from particularistic socio-economic groups from the beginning of 
multi-party politics. Accordingly, political patronage became a fundamental policy to obtain 
votes in a way that frequently uses religion as a source of political support. Hence “state 
centered polity” shifted to “party centered polity” as a result of the multi-party politics that 
enabled DP to obtain political power in 1950 and continued by other center-right parties such 
as Justice Party and True Path Party. 
Besides the historical evolution of political patronage, Heper and Keyman (1998) 
provide an analysis of factors that contributed to the establishment of political patronage of 
multi-party politics in Turkey. The rising political elite represented themselves as the 
“proponents of national will” and positioned against the state will. Hence the political elite 
introduced a more responsive government mechanism between the electorate and political 
authorities. This political responsiveness with respect to inequalities leads to the provision of 
particularistic favors for those in need, especially in local political arena. Emerging public 
sector supported political elite in their responses to meet the popular demands at the time. DP 
as a new party introduced an alternative political machine compared to politics of CHP that 
dominated the republican history before. DP as a political organization was less interested in 
political ideologies and more in “securing and holding office”. The ideal of reelection 
contributed to the emergence of “pork-barrel grants” concerning the public sector of “roads, 
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schools, electricity, mosques and the like”. The principles of policy making remained 
particularistic and political parties detached themselves from rationally formulated policy-
making processes. Besides, Heper and Keyman (1998) emphasizes that political parties do 
not choose to mention the merits of their policy programs instead of involving in 
particularistic exchanges in order to gain votes. The political parties rather depend on 
patronage power to convince their electoral constituencies that are driven by popular 
demands. This relationship of exchange through patronage linkages puts pressure on 
parliamentarians to repay their “debt” to people that enabled them as the governors through 
their vote (Heper and Keyman 1998).  
Moreover, Kalaycioglu (1995, 1997 and 2001) gives comprehensive understandings 
of how this links that are based on “nepotism, favoritism, family bonds and religious 
solidarity” are established and why they are likely to continue. According to Kalaycıoglu 
(1997) clientelism represents a mechanism of “providing have-nots some of their most 
desired values of respect, security and welfare”. This mechanism reproduces itself through 
elections which provide a relation of exchange between electorate and political authorities 
(Kalaycioglu 2001). In such an environment voting is not only a mean to democratic 
representation for the electorate but also provides greater access to resources of state through 
political parties. That is how distribution of favors becomes one of the essential rules of the 
exchange between party and the electorate. However, the particularistic distribution of favors 
brings along its dilemmas. First, “democracy is maintained at the expense of the rule of law” 
in a political environment dominated by patronage based linkages. Since it would be hard to 
distribute favors if practices of government is based on “meritocratic grounds” through 
“transparent procedures”, the rule of law needs to be relaxed in order to respond to the 
clientele. Second, the tradeoff between popular governments versus good governance 
generates a tension on the budget processes and public spending (Kalaycioglu 2001). Despite 
its dilemmas Kalaycioglu (1995) argues that “the parliamentary party does and will continue 
to function as a ticket for more emoluments from the state budget, than as a flag of 
ideological distinction”.   
3. The Argument 
So far I tried to discuss the social policy mechanisms and clientelistic linkages that 
determine the choices of government agents with respect to their budgetary decisions 
separately. The social spending as a component of welfare expenditures represents a 
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programmatic distribution of benefits that does not necessarily exclude particular groups in 
the society. Rather social spending aims to balance the inequalities in the society through 
facilitating the ones in need. However, social policy on the other hand provides a tool for 
governments that might increase the chances of reelection via the processes of budget 
allocation at the local level. Although the programmatic spending is determined through 
demographic factors, the particularistic allocation of social spending might encourage 
strategic involvement of political variables into policy-making processes. The electorate is 
highly responsive to the welfare provision at the local level. Despite the lack of direct 
personalistic linkages between patron and client as expected from a typical clientelistic 
exchange, incumbent political parties are able to differentiate themselves from their 
competitors through particularistic spending mechanisms in the eyes of the constituents. The 
local incumbents control resources that enable them to target and spend more in particular 
constituencies depending on the demographic, economic as well as political factors. 
Kitschelt and Kselman (2011) differentiate the clientelistic forms of democratic 
accountability from the programmatic accountability relations between political parties and 
society. In contrast to direct exchange between voters and politicians in regards to 
clientelistic relations; programmatic accountability relations prevail where winning parties 
offer club and collective goods, the provision of which is not based on the vote or other 
services. However, the Huber and Ting (2009) also suggest that particularistic spending with 
targeted policy programs became a more efficient tool for attracting votes, compared to 
standard tax and transfer models of redistribution. The studies based on redistributive policies 
of governments fail to understand why poor vote for right wing parties that redistribute less. 
That is why; the literature on government expenditures focuses more on particularistic or 
clientelistic networks recently.  
The public social expenditures as the focus of this research can be identified as 
programmatic spending with respect to the differentiation Kitschelt and Kselman (2011) 
suggests. However, it is not possible to claim that the social spending decisions are irrelevant 
to particularistic distribution of government resources; even if it does not suggest a direct 
exchange between voters and politicians. Although the social spending is programmatic in 
nature, the social spending might become particularistic through strategic allocation of social 
expenditures across metropolitan municipalities. Accordingly, the variation within social 
spending of metropolitan municipalities might be explained by political factors concerning 
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incumbency advantage and political competition, apart from the programmatic determinants 
of welfare spending. 
Lemarchand and Legg (1972) argue that clientelism provides an alternative to “social 
security” function of the modern welfare state when society is dissatisfied with the protective 
or redistributive capacity of the state. The argument can be expanded to other functions of 
welfare state as well. When the social function of state is defined within the particularistic 
relations based on patronage, even the provision of social goods and services becomes more 
likely to be manipulated to reinforce power. Moreover, Pappas (2009) emphasizes the 
“selective distribution of public goods” as a convenient strategy for the political parties 
depending on patronage.  
Based on the discussions, I will examine the effect of political variables on the 
variation within social spending levels across metropolitan municipalities in Turkey, 
controlling for demographic and socio-economic factors. The research concerns the explicit 
effect of the political variables of interest that are electoral competition and incumbency 
advantage in explaining the social spending decisions at the local level in Turkey between 
1997-2010. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1.Data and Analysis 
 The cross-sectional time series data from 16 Turkish metropolitan municipality final 
accounts are used to conduct the empirical analysis. The data cover the years between 1997 
and 2010. However; it requires two separate analyses to examine the dataset due to the 
changes in records of final accounts beginning with the year 2006. The data from 1997 to the 
latest release of TUIK on the final accounts and budgets of municipalities in 2005 constitute 
the first part of the dataset.44 Second part of the dataset relies on the final account data 
gathered from each metropolitan municipality for the purpose of analysis, since TUIK did not 
release that particular data after 2005. Through metropolitan municipalities’ method of 
budget itemization, the second part of dataset provides a more detailed recording of 
municipality budgets. However, data for some items do not exist for all municipalities since 
the metropolitan municipalities keep record of their final accounts independently. Although it 
                                                           




is not possible to match every item on the final accounts across 16 metropolitan 
municipalities, the institutional, functional and economic categorization provides a common 
ground for cross-sectional analysis. However there are missing observations in the second 
part of the data set. The final accounts of metropolitan municipalities are not easily accessible 
for the years after TUIK’s latest release in 2005. Although some of the metropolitan 
municipalities publish either their final accounts or annual reports online and others provide 
data upon request, missing data still generates a problem because of the discrepancies across 
budgeting methods of metropolitan municipalities. 45  Besides the data on metropolitan 
municipality budgets, the main dataset for elections is taken from Carroll and Kemahlioglu 
(2010) with an addition of latest local elections in 2009 and national elections in 2011.     
The research aims to analyze the particular variables discussed in the clientelism 
literature to understand the impact of political determinants on social spending of local 
governments. The programmatic explanations of welfare spending as well as socio-economic 
variables of control are included in order to separate out the effect of political variables on 
social expenditures. The dependent variable is social spending. 46  However, what is 
categorized under social spending requires detailed explanation due to the differences 
between recording methods of TUIK and metropolitan municipalities. First part of the 
analysis corresponds to the years between 1997 and 2005 which accommodated coalition 
governments before AKP’s rise to power as a single party in the government in 2002 national 
elections as well as AKP's early years in the government. The first part of the dataset 
provides information only on social transfers of metropolitan municipalities. These social 
transfers recorded under the transfer expenditures will be examined as the main component of 
social spending before 2006.  
Second part of the analysis covers the years between 2006 and 2010 and the final 
accounts for that period are gathered from municipalities. The recording is more detailed and 
includes different components of social spending under various departments of metropolitan 
municipalities. However, main components of social spending analysis after 2006 consist of 
social assistance services; health services; and education services. Social spending as 
aggregate sum of these as well as components themselves is analyzed in order to understand 
whether there are political explanations to the variation within social spending. Although the 
                                                           
45 The metropolitan municipalities of Ankara, Gaziantep, Diyabakır and Antalya either failed to keep records or 
provide final accounts for certain years. Most of the data concerning these years was collected from their annual 
reports which does not provide as detailed data as final accounts. 
46 Figure 2 provides descriptive statistics for dependent variable in appendix. 
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main dependent variable of concern is social spending, the final accounts after 2006 provide 
data for further examination of different types of expenditures. The analysis of social 
spending includes the spending on services of social assistance, education and health. 
Besides, the examination of public welfare spending and total expenditures will also 
contribute to an analysis of local governments’ spending decisions. The analysis of the 
different forms of spending will help me to compare between what I expect to be 
programmatic and particularistic types of spending. Moreover, the variation within total 
spending47 will also help to understand the tensions between local and national governments 
regarding the spending decisions which are highly debated in the literature.  
 The final part of the analysis concerns the effect of social spending decisions on 
political parties' votes in the elections. The study of Kemahlıoglu and Ozdemir (2012) also 
analyze whether partisan affiliation at the local level contributed to the success of AKP 
through easier access to government resources during their one-party government. Prior to 
the effect of budgetary decisions -social spending for this research- on electoral outcomes, the 
analyses of votes in national and local elections suggest that having control over metropolitan 
municipalities benefit those incumbent parties in the elections, controlling for socioeconomic 
indicators. Tables 1 and 2 indicate that AKP and its predecessors increase their vote shares in 
provinces where they have partisan ties with the mayors of those metropolitan municipalities 
both in national and local elections, independent from their budget allocation. The AKP and 
its predecessors benefit from their local ties in national elections, beginning with 2002 (See 
Table 1). Moreover, beside AKP that holds incumbency advantage in the latest local elections 
of 2009, the predecessors of AKP also benefited from their incumbency advantage before 
2004 in the local elections (See Table 2). 
Although most of the mayors48 seem to increase their votes in the local elections with 
respect to their partisan ties, the mechanism of incumbency advantage does not benefit either 
CHP and its predecessors or MHP in national elections.49 The access to the government 
resources and the distribution mechanisms at the local level might be a determinant of the 
increases in vote shares. Although this study does not answer if there are discrepancies with 
respect to the accession to government resources among local governments with different 
                                                           
47 Both social spending as a share of revenues and social spending per capita across municipalities are 
examined. 
48 Except independents, all mayors seem to benefit from incumbency advantage in local elections. 
49 Although it is not included in the tables, the incumbency advantage does not have an impact on the vote share 
of independents either.  
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party affiliations, the research tries to answer if the distribution mechanisms at the local level 
can be explained by political variables through social spending as a share of revenues, given 
the same resources. Besides the budgetary analysis, the variation within spending levels 
might help to explain the changes in vote shares of the political parties in the elections. That 
is why this study also tries to suggest an answer to how do social policy preferences of local 
governments affect electoral outcomes with respect to their spending decisions. The answers 
to the question do not only contribute to the literature on the determinants of voting behavior, 
but also to the studies of social policy. Since the research is based on statistical analysis with 
aggregate data, it is not possible to understand the mechanisms of voting behavior that 
indicates the causal linkages between the variables of interest. However, it is also noteworthy 
to detect a linkage between social policy preferences of local governments and vote of 
constituencies that might encourage further research. Hence, the final part of the analysis 
aims to examine the influence of particularistic social policy decisions of local governments 
(meaning social spending within the scope of this research) on the vote share of political 
parties in the elections. The analysis will help me to understand whether increasing social 
spending at the local level benefits mayors or the parties they are affiliated with either in the 
local or national elections respectively.  
4.2.Explanatory Variables 
 The main hypothesis to test is whether the political variables affect the social 
spending decision of local governments or not. Although the social spending is basically 
related to demographics and socioeconomics of a province, political variables of interest are 
also expected to contribute explaining the variation within social spending across 16 
metropolitan municipalities of Turkey. The theoretical arguments follow two different set of 
explanatory variables, as well as factors of control. The political variables compose the main 
variables of interest which are electoral competition and incumbency affiliation. Both 
variables are widely referred as potential determinants of particularistic distribution at the 
sub-national level. Second group of explanatory variables develops from the literature on 
welfare spending. Higher ratios of old, disabled and students to the population constitute the 
main correlates of programmatic social spending which includes spending on social 
assistance, education and health services. Including these welfare explanatory variables into 
analysis enables me to differentiate the impact of the political variables.  
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 The impact of political variables might work either way, as it is discussed earlier. The 
literature on patronage suggests that the incumbency advantage might encourage 
particularistic social spending through easier access to government resources (Wright 1974; 
Grossman 1994; Worthingon and Dollary 1998; Travits 2009; Roszvitch and Weiss 1993). 
Moreover, the mayors might tend to spend more on social expenditures in face of political 
competition in order to increase their chances in the elections through targeting swing voters, 
especially if they have partisan ties with national incumbents. On the other hand, the 
literature on partisan ties expects local governments with incumbency affiliation to decrease 
their spending in order to reduce the pressure on national budget concerning macroeconomic 
stability (Remmer and Wibbels 2000; Jones et. al. 2000; Khemani 2002; Kemahlioglu 2009). 
Especially the provinces with loyal voters might enable strategic control over sub-national 
budgets. The analysis results will guide the discussion on the two sided expectations from 
different stands of the literature on budgetary choices. However, an increase in social 
spending with respect to political competition and incumbency advantage at the local level is 
expected in this research. Accordingly, the results might suggest particularistic social 
spending at the sub-national level in Turkey. Political parties holding mayors’ position at the 
metropolitan municipalities are expected to increase social spending if they encounter with 
relatively stronger competitors at the local electoral arena compared to the municipalities that 
do not experience intense electoral competition. 
The political variables of interest as the main independent variables are composed 
from the electoral dataset. The incumbency affiliation is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 when the mayor of metropolitan municipality has partisan affiliation with the 
national incumbents in government and 0 otherwise. 50  The political competition is the 
difference between the vote shares of mayor’s party and the party following the winner in 
local elections.51 Therefore, political competition generates a negative effect on dependent 
variable as the political competition becomes tighter when the difference between first two 
parties’ vote share decreases. The ratio of old population, young population and disabled 
population within total population as the variables of explanation concerning welfare 
spending are taken from TUIK’s data on population statistics. 
4.3.Variables of Control 
                                                           
50 Figure 3 provides descriptive statistics for explanatory variable incumbency affiliation in appendix. 
51 Figure 4 provides descriptive statistics for explanatory variable political competition in appendix. 
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 I included certain control variables into the empirical analysis to capture other 
demographic, socio-economic and partisan effects on social spending.52 First, there are other 
demographic variables such as population and district magnitude that might have an effect on 
the amount of social spending. The population is included for the analysis of social spending 
as a share of revenues to address the variation with respect to the size of the provinces. As the 
population increases, the size of budget increases including the amount of social spending. 
The banks per capita and literacy rate are included to control for the socioeconomic 
discrepancies across provinces. District magnitude is also discussed as a determinant of the 
distribution of material benefits in the literature (Carey and Shugart 1995). With respect to 
social spending in this analysis, lower district magnitude is expected to increase the 
distribution of particularistic benefits by making electoral competition more candidate-
oriented. Therefore, districts with fewer seats available to national representation becomes a 
more open ground for particularistic allocation of spending.53  Besides, the partisan affiliation 
of political parties also has an effect on the decision of social spending. The expectation in 
the literature towards the left-oriented parties to spend more compared to right-oriented ones 
requires inclusion of a control factor concerning the partisan affiliation of mayors at the local 
governments.54 The placement of political parties on the ideological spectrum of left-right 
enables researchers to analyze the impact of partisan effect on the policy decisions. Although 
center-periphery cleavage dominated the Turkish politics literature for a long time, Secor 
(2001) suggests left-right as a “salient axis of competition” in Turkish political arena 
following 1940s; even though he does not link economic and political issues in a ‘typical’ 
left-right package for Turkish political parties.55 
Another set of control variables is employed in the electoral analyses. The vote share 
of the political parties in the previous elections controls for the general level of political 
support for political parties in a province. Besides, it is also necessary to control for 
socioeconomic factors that might have an effect on the changes in parties’ political support in 
the ballot box. Since particular policies implemented between elections might benefit 
                                                           
52 A dummy variable for the years of elections is also included into regresssions to control for the changes in 
budget due to the general and national elections. However, having an election does not significantly change any 
of the budgetary decisions in years of elections.  
53 Kemahlıoglu (2008) uses this measure to control for the candidate oriented competition while explaining the 
particularistic distribution of investment subsidies in Turkey.  
54 See Esping-Andersen 1990, Huber and Stephens 2001, Bradley et al. 2003a, Castles 2004, Iversen and 
Soskice 2006, Iversen and Stephens 2008 for a detailed discussion of partisan effect and inclination of left-wing 
parties towards social spending. 




different electorate groups disproportionately, the socioeconomic composition of 
constituency might be determining on votes. If there is incumbency advantage at the local 
level under such circumstances, the changes in political support might be misinterpreted. Due 
to their incumbency advantage, previous local governors generally take the credit for the 
socioeconomic developments in an electoral area. Therefore, socioeconomic indicators are 
included to control for the increase in vote share of local incumbents due to the 
socioeconomic developments in the province. Hence, the banks per capita as an economic 
indicator, change in banks per capita as an index of the recent economic developments in a 
province and the literacy rate as a socioeconomic indicator are included to control for the 
discrepancies across provinces to capture the disproportionate changes in vote share of 
political parties in the elections.    
Among the control variables population, literacy rate and district magnitude of the 
province in national elections are gathered from TUIK’s databases on population and 
elections. The data on the number of banks in provinces to generate variables of banks per 
capita and change in banks per capita is collected from the database of the Banks Association 
of Turkey. The control variable ‘banks per capita’ is a count of banks in a province per year, 
considering the ones that are opened up and closed down every year. The ‘change in banks 
per capita’ is the count of banks’ difference between two election years. The partisan effect is 
generated according to successive surveys on placement of political parties on the left-right 
specturum on the voters for the years after 200256  and on Secor’s (2001) discussion of 
Turkish political parties’ placement on the left-right axis before 2002.   
4.4.Methodology 
 The dependent variable of the analysis is the amount of social expenditures as a share 
of revenues that metropolitan municipalities spend per year. 57  Besides total social 
expenditures after 2006 and social transfers before 2005; social assistance, health services 
and education services as a share of revenues that constitute the main components of social 
spending are separately analyzed. The second part of the analysis concerns the vote share of 
political parties in the national and local elections as the dependent variable of electoral 
analysis. While examining budgetary data, regressions are estimated with Driscoll and Kraay 
standard errors to address serial correlation and cross-sectional dependence (Hoechle 2007). 
                                                           
56 The data on political parties’ placement after 2002 is provided by Kalaycıoglu on 23 May 2012. 
57 The same analyses are also conducted for social expenditures per capita. 
38 
 
Moreover, fixed effect regressions with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors are also employed 
separately to address the discrepancies across metropolitan municipalities which might not be 
covered by the control variables included. The results of fixed effect analyses will also be 
reported additionally. Finally, a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) method is employed to 
analyze the electoral data in order to understand whether budgetary choices have an effect on 
vote share of the political parties in either national or local elections.  
4.5.Findings 
Results from two separate analyses are reported for budgetary decisions. First part of 
the analysis concerns the social transfers between the years 1997- 2005, while the second part 
includes a more detailed analysis of social spending as well as different kinds of 
expenditures58 between 2006 and 2010. The final part of the research analyzes whether the 
spending decisions of local governments have an impact on the votes of political parties 
either in general or local elections. The discussion of results will start with budgetary analysis 
and will be followed by the impact of that particular spending decision on vote shares of the 
political parties in the elections. The analysis of elections is important to understand the 
impact of spending decisions, especially for incumbents that have control over the budget. 
4.5.1. Social transfers 
According to Table 3, the results support the expectation of political parties to spend 
more through social transfers59 from the local budget in their stronghold provinces controlling 
for other factors. Mayors that are affiliated with national incumbents spend more on social 
transfers in constituencies with loyal supporters.60 The partisan ties at the local government 
decrease the effect of interaction between incumbency affiliation and political competition on 
social spending. In other words, the increase in social transfers is even more for the parties 
that are not affiliated with the incumbents, facing the same level of competition. Moreover, 
higher ratios of old to population61, lower district magnitude and higher population increases 
the share of social transfers among expenditures, as expected. Although the analysis verifies 
                                                           
58 All expenditures are employed as a share of total expenditure, except the total expenditure which is calculated 
as a share of revenues through out the regressions. 
59 The same results are also verified for the social transfers per capita, only with magnified coefficients and 
robust standard errors for the independent variables. 
60 The standard error for the interaction term is 0.02. The coefficient is statistically significant at 90 percent. 
61 The ratio of disabled population is also employed an alternative to the ratio of old in order to control for the 
effect of welfare spending. Similar to ratio of old population, higher ratios of disabled population increases 
social transfers significantly. 
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these results for local governments between 1997 and 2005, political variables do not have an 
impact on social transfers after 2002 that corresponds to years of AKP incumbency (Table 3, 
Column 2). Accordingly, social transfers at the local level are only sensitive to demographic 
and socioeconomic indicators such as population, literacy rate and ratio between 2002 and 
2005. Besides higher ratios of old population, lower ratios of literacy rate increases social 
transfers as well during the first years of AKP government. Before 2002 (Table 3, Column 3), 
local partisans of national incumbents as well as the mayors of opposition parties’ tend to 
spend more on loyal voters through social transfers in their stronghold provinces.62  The 
results for the fixed effect regressions are also indicated in Table 3a.63 
The effect of social transfers on the vote share of parties in the general and local 
elections are indicated in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.  It is not possible to observe any significant 
effect of social transfers for the local incumbents neither for general or municipal elections 
except its effect on MHP’s political support in national elections, controlling for the 
socioeconomic indicators. Fourth column of the Table 3.1 indicates that MHP increased their 
vote share in national elections in provinces where they spend more through social transfers. 
It means that although the mayors tend to spend more through social transfers in their 
stronghold provinces, the increases in social transfers between 1997 and 2005 do not reflect 
on the vote share of political parties in the elections most of the time.   
4.5.2. Social spending 
 The second part of the statistical analysis enables me to examine the social spending 
decisions of the government in detail with respect to the availability of a more prosperous 
data on metropolitan municipalities’ final accounts after 2006. Before the separate results of 
each type of social spending, the analysis of aggregate social spending provides noteworthy 
results controlling for the population, literacy rate and district magnitude, besides ratio of old 
population. The partisan affiliation with national incumbent reflects as an increase in social 
spending in the municipal budget. As it is indicated in first column of Table 4, the social 
spending64 of AKP (as the only incumbent after 2006) increases when the incumbent’s vote 
share is equal to its main competitor at the local level. The results of total social expenditures 
                                                           
62 The standard error for the interaction term is 0.02. 
63 The fixed effect regressions imply that the only strategic distribution of social transfers occurs after 2002, 
during AKP government. The metropolitan mınicipalities that are affiliated with AKP as the incumbent as well 
as mayors of opposition tend to increase social transfers in face of political competition after 2002. 
64 Same results for social spending per capita are also verified, only with magnified effect of coefficients and 
larger standard errors of independent variables. 
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do not provide evidence of a strategic control over the local budget in face of competition, 
irrespective of the partisan ties of mayors with national incumbents. The results for fixed 
effect regressions of social spending analysis are presented in Table 4a.65  
The inclusion of the population to the regression provides a control for the variation 
within social spending due to the size of the municipality. The population is significantly 
increases the social spending as expected. The literacy rate is employed in order to control for 
the socio-economic discrepancies across metropolitan municipalities. However, the linkage 
between social spending and literacy rate contradicts with the expectations. Although social 
spending is expected to increase in provinces where socioeconomic indicators are poor, the 
aggregate social spending increases with higher levels of literacy rate according to the 
statistical analysis. On the other hand, banks per capita as an economic indicator influences 
social spending negatively as expected. In other words, social spending increases in provinces 
where economic indicators are poor. The district magnitude is negatively correlated with the 
social spending as expected. A decrease in district magnitude makes the political competition 
more candidate-oriented in the elections as a result of which might boost the spending to 
increase the chances in the elections. Moreover, the ratio of the old to population to account 
for the explanations regarding welfare spending did not have any impact on the social 
spending, unexpectedly. 66  Although the ratio of old accounts for one of the main 
determinants of the social spending, in Turkey political variables seem to explain the 
variation within social spending more compared to the variables of welfare literature.  
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 indicate the effect of social spending on the vote share of political 
parties in general and local elections, respectively. According to the analyses, social spending 
decisions do not have a considerable effect on the vote share of political parties neither in 
general or local elections. Accordingly, although mayors with partisan ties spend more on 
social expenditures, increases in social spending do not have a significant effect on vote 
shares of political parties in the elections. 
                                                           
65 The fixed effect regressions do not provide significant results for total social spending and health services. 
Neither tends to change with respect to political variables of interest. The mayors with partisan ties increases 
their spending on social assistance services in face of political competition, while mayors of opposition allocate 
this resource more towards their loyal voters. Moreover, both types of mayors increase their spending on 
education services in provinces with loyal voters.  
66 Similar to ratio of old among population,  the ratio of disabled people does not also have an impact on social 
spending after 2006.  
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In addition to the total social spending; the effect of political variables on social 
assistance, health services and education services are analyzed and discussed separately. 
4.5.3. Social assistance services 
Table 4 (Column 2) indicates the impact of the political variables on the decision of 
the social assistance distribution, controlling for the ratio of old population, population and 
literacy rate. Accordingly, incumbent affiliated mayors 67  as well as the mayors of the 
opposition parties tend to increase the spending on social assistance in provinces with loyal 
voters. Therefore, spending on social assistance seems to support the arguments on 
particularistic distribution of the resources through local governments in their stronghold 
constituencies in this case.  
Although political variables are the focus of this research, the ratio of old to the 
population as well as socioeconomic controls deserves attention. The ratio of old as one of 
the explanatory variables of welfare spending does not have a significant effect on social 
assistance spending, unexpectedly. Although the welfare literature expects an increase in 
social spending (or services of social assistance at this point), the results indicate that higher 
levels of the ratio of old to the population do not significantly change social assistance 
spending from the metropolitan municipality budgets. Although there is an expectation 
towards an increase in social spending with respect to lower literacy rates and banks per 
capita as socioeconomic indicators, neither of the indicators have a significant impact on this 
form of social spending. Moreover, higher population decreases while larger district 
magnitude increases spending on social assistance, unexpectedly.  
As it is indicated in Table 4.4, the spending through social assistance does not have an 
impact on vote shares of the political parties in local elections. However, social assistance 
expenditures of the local governors that are affiliated with national incumbents increases the 
vote share of AKP (as the only incumbent after 2006) at the national elections (See Table 
4.3).68 Moreover, the spending on social assistance services at the local level benefits parties 
with no ties to national incumbent even more at the national elections (See Table 4.3). 
Despite the positive effect of social assistance spending on political parties with partisan ties 
as well as others that are not affiliated with national incumbents, the results do not suggest 
any particular party or political tendency that benefits from the social assistance expenditures. 
                                                           
67 The standard error for the interaction term is 0.003. 
68 The standard error for the interaction term is 0.35. 
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Neither of the party affiliations including AKP, CHP or MHP increase their political support 
through higher social assistance expenditures at the local level. Finally, the strategic 
distribution of local resources favors the loyal voters in case of spending on social assistance 
regardless of the political parties’ partisan ties and the increases in spending through social 
assistance services reflect on the vote share of political parties at the national elections.   
4.5.4. Health services 
The results for the analysis of spending on health services are presented in Table 4 
(Column 3). The results imply that AKP affiliated local governments tend to increase 
spending on health services if they are challenged by a strong competitor at the local 
elections.69 It suggests that the mayors with partisan ties target swing voters. On the other 
hand, political parties that are not affiliated with the incumbents do not significantly change 
spending on health services in regard to competition. The ratio of old as welfare explanatory 
variable contradicts with the expectation, since the spending on health services is expected to 
be higher in provinces with higher ratios of old population. While population and 
socioeconomic indicators do not have an impact, bigger district magnitudes decrease the 
amount of spending on health services.  
The spending on health services does not have a significant impact on the vote share 
of political parties in local elections70 (See Table 4.6). However, AKP and its predecessors 
increase their vote share in national elections through higher levels of spending on health 
services in metropolitan municipalities where they hold the mayor’s position (See Table 
4.5).71 
4.5.5. Education services 
As indicated in Table 4 (Column 4), the political variables of interest do not have 
considerable impact on education services controlling for population, ratio of young to the 
population and literacy rate and district magnitude, unlike other components of social 
spending. The reason for the unexpected results for spending on education services might 
occur due to fewer observations, compared to other forms of social spending. The spending 
                                                           
69 The standard error for the interaction term is 0.01. 
70 Although MHP seems to increase its vote share in local elections through health spending, it is hard to 
interpret as such since the interaction between MHP incumbency and health spending is omitted from the 
regression because of the collinearity. The reason might be the scarcity of observations with MHP incumbency 
at the local level. 
71 The standard error for the interaction term is 0.15. 
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on education services are not itemized in many of the metropolitan municipality final 
accounts. It is possible that different municipalities included education spending under 
different kinds of expenditures instead of having a separate item for education services that 
appeared as missing data for this analysis.72  
In addition to political variables, the welfare and control variables also do not respond 
to the expectations. The higher ratios of population who are aged within the range that benefit 
from the education services is expected to increase social spending through education 
services. However the ratio of young to the population significantly decreases the 
expenditures on education services. The population is not associated with the decision of 
education spending according to the results. Moreover, literacy rate as socioeconomic and 
banks per capita as economic indicators increase the social spending in provinces where they 
are higher. The reason might be the increase in demand for education services in provinces 
with better socioeconomic composition.    
The effect of education spending on the vote share of political parties either in 
national or local elections is weak. Only the education spending of mayors that are affiliated 
with CHP or its predecessors benefit those parties in national elections in terms of vote shares 
(See Table 4.7). 73  Other than that, spending on education services does not have any 
significant impact on the vote share of political parties in the elections.   
4.5.6. Other dependent variables 
Apart from the analyses of social transfers or social spending, the dataset enables me 
to explore further on different kinds of spending after 2006 as well as the total expenditures 
for both datasets. The research aims to understand whether social spending corresponds to 
particularistic or programmatic spending. However, spending on public welfare services is 
also related to the research in a sense that provision of welfare services implies a 
programmatic spending in comparative literature. Therefore, the analysis of public welfare 
spending at the municipality level in Turkey contributes to this research as well as the 
literature in Turkey. The examination of total expenditures in Turkish metropolitan 
municipalities will suggests empirical evidence on the discussions of local governments’ 
                                                           
72 Although the Law Number 5216 of metropolitan municipalities defines spending on education services 
among the responsibilities of metropolitan municipalities in case of necessity under Article 7, the method of 
budgetary itemization of the expenditures is not specified under law. That might be the reason for differnces 
across final accounts with respect to their recording methodologies.    
73 The standard error of the interaction term is 0.66. The coefficient is significant at 90 percent. 
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budget allocation on spending with respect to their incumbency affiliation and the 
competitiveness of political arena. 
4.5.6.1.Public welfare spending 
The public welfare spending -according to functional categorization of the final 
accounts- includes the provision of basic good services such as water and lightening of streets 
(Yenturk 2011). Although the provision of public goods is expected to be related mainly to 
demographic and socioeconomic factors that are included as control, the empirical analysis 
suggests a link between political variables and public welfare spending (See Table 5). The 
literature on pork-barrel relations recognize the fact that the involvement of the political 
processes might result in inefficient (either overprovision or under provision) provision of 
public goods (Lizzeri and Persico 2001). Although pork-barrel politics concentrate more on 
the particular public investment in search of electoral support (Enelow and Hinich 1984), it is 
commonly argued that the political and electoral incentives encourage the politicians to 
allocate benefits disproportionately while sharing costs (Denzau and Mackay 1976; 
Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen 1981; Baron 1991). Moreover, evidence suggests a linkage 
between intense party competition and increase in welfare expenditures (Dawson and 
Robinson, 1963). In line with arguments, the results suggest that the local governments that 
are affiliated with national incumbents tend to increase spending on public good provision in 
the face of intense political competition at the local level in Turkey after 2006 (Table 5, 
Column 1).74 Moreover, local governments that do not have partisan ties with the national 
incumbents tend to increase public welfare spending in their stronghold provinces with loyal 
voters. Local spending on public welfare is expected to increase in provinces where 
socioeconomic indicators are lower. The public welfare spending increases as the number of 
banks per capita and literacy rates get lower; as well as by larger population expectedly.  
Moreover, integrating partisan effect into analysis changes the impact of political 
competition on public welfare expenditures of local governments that are not affiliated with 
the national incumbents.75 Although mayors of opposition parties seem to spend more on 
public welfare in their stronghold constituencies, they turn out to spend more in face of 
electoral competition when the partisan effect is included in the regression. The second 
                                                           
74 The standard error of the interaction term is 0.03. 
75 The results do not change for the local governments that are affiliated with national incumbents after 
integrating partisan effect to the regression. 
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column of Table 5 indicates that, the parties at the local government significantly spend less 
when they move right in the ideological spectrum after 2006. It means that mayors that are 
affiliated with right wing parties (namely AKP’s mayors) tend to decrease their spending on 
public welfare compared to mayors of left-wing parties. This result on public welfare 
spending supports the expectations of welfare literature that associates welfare expenditures 
with left-wing parties most of the time. The results for the fixed effect regressions of public 
welfare expenditures analysis are indicated in Table 5a. 76 
4.5.6.2.Total expenditures 
As Table 6 indicates; total expenditures 77  as a share of revenues is sensitive to 
incumbency affiliation regardless of the level of competition; controlling for population, 
district magnitude as demographic, banks per capita and literacy rate as socioeconomic 
indicators. The political parties at the local government tends to spend more in total as a share 
of their revenues, if they have partisan ties with the national incumbents in general as well as 
after 2002 in particular. It means that the metropolitan municipalities that are affiliated with 
AKP spend more in total, compared to ones that do not have partisan ties with the AKP after 
2002. Moreover, tighter competition significantly increases the total expenditures in a 
constituency regardless of the partisan affiliation of the mayor after 2002 (Table 6, Column 
3). Accordingly, AKP affiliated mayors spend more in total at the local level and mayors with 
any partisan affiliation tend to spend more in face of political competition after 2002. 
However, the results on total expenditures do not imply any strategic distribution of resources 
for local partisans of national incumbents in particular with respect to political competition 
(Table 6, Column 2). The effect of banks per capita and district magnitude is negative, while 
the effect of population is positive on total expenditures. Hence the local governments tend to 
increase spending in provinces with lower economic development and where elections are 
more candidate-oriented. The results of the fixed effect regressions for total expenditures are 
indicated in Table 6a.78 
                                                           
76 The fixed effect regressions suggest that the political competition does not have an impact of public welfare 
spending decisions of local governments after 2006. However, the mayors that are affiliated with national 
incumbents (namely AKP) tend to spend more as a share of their revenues, compared to other mayors with other 
party affiliations. Moreover, partisan effect also does not have an impact on public welfare spending according 
to the results of fixed effect regressions.  
77 The same relation between political variables and total expenditures is also verified for total expenditures per 
cap, controlling for population, literacy rate and district magnitude. 
78 Although fixed effect regressions do not provide significant results for the period 1997-2010, the results after 
2002 are noticable. The second column of the table indicates that the mayors with partisan ties are inclined to 
46 
 
4.6.Discussion of Results 
Figure 1. The stategic budgetary allocation of local governments 79 




inc=0 X  
inc=1 X  
Social assistance 
services 
inc=0 X  
inc=1 X  
Health services 
inc=0 - - 
inc=1  X 
Public welfare spending 
inc=0  X 
inc=1  X 
      
The results of the budgetary analysis suggest that mayors with partisan ties increase 
their spending on health services in particular, in face of political competition after 2006. 
Moreover, they also tend to increase their social transfers before 2005 in provinces with loyal 
voters. Accordingly, the social spending decisions of local governments that have partisan 
ties with national incumbents provide evidence for both types of strategic spending with 
respect to the political variables of interest. However, spending on health services particularly 
supports the argument that local partisans might provide room for strategic maneuver at the 
local level to national incumbents as a result of which might help to gain support from the 
swing voters. On the other hand, mayors that do not have partisan ties with national 
incumbents increase their social spending only through social assistance services as well as 
social transfers in their stronghold provinces with loyal voters. There is no evidence of 
particularistic distribution of resources in face of intense political competition concerning the 
mayors of opposition parties. Moreover, there is no evidence of a decrease in social spending 
in metropolitan municipalities where mayor has partisan ties with the national incumbents. 
The arguments in the literature that expect an interference with local spending decisions in 
order to reduce the pressure on incumbents’ budget through their local partisans do not gain 
evidential support from the budgetary analysis of social expenditures. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
decrease their total expenditures, in line with the expectations of partisan ties literature. Moreover, mayors with 
partisan ties (AKP mayors) tend to spend more in provinces with loyal voters, while mayors that are not 
affiliated with AKP increases spending in provinces with competitive votes. Accordingly, the total spending 
decsion of local governments with different partisan affiliations strategically diverge with respect to political 
competition at the local level.  
79 Figure 1 represents the stategic budgetary allocation of local governments with respect to their partisan 
affiliation with the national incumbents.  
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The effect of spending decisions on the vote share of political parties in national and 
local elections is rather weak. The results suggest that the social transfers before 2005 and 
aggregate social spending after 2006 do not have an impact on votes in the elections. Only 
spending on health services increases the vote share of AKP (and its predecessors) in 
provinces where those parties have incumbency advantages through their local partisans at 
mayor’s position. Besides, any mayor with incumbency affiliation as well as others that do 
not have partisan ties contributes to vote share of his/her party at the national elections in 
constituencies where they spend more on social assistance expenditures. Therefore only 
conclusion from the electoral analysis follows as; although there is no impact of social 
spending decisions on the vote share of political parties at local elections, increases in 
particular spending types at the local level (such as spending on health services and social 
assistance) contributes to the success of political parties at the national elections, especially 
for those who are national incumbents. 
 Although political variables are expected to be irrelevant for public welfare spending, 
the results encourage further research on public good allocation of local governments in order 
to verify the results and clarify the reasons beneath. Besides social spending, the public 
welfare expenditures of a metropolitan municipality are also sensitive political competition. 
Both types of mayors (either affiliated with the national incumbent parties or not) tend to 
increase public welfare spending in face of political competition. Rather than incumbency 
affiliation, party ideology becomes a more important determinant of the public welfare 
spending at the local level. The mayors tend to spend more on public welfare provision as the 
political parties they are affiliated with move left on the ideological spectrum.  
The results for total expenditures analysis suggest two different interpretations for 
political variables, independent of each other. First, the total expenditures of mayors that are 
affiliated with the incumbents are significantly higher than the others that do not have 
partisan ties with the national incumbents, when the vote share of incumbent party is equal to 
its main competitor’s votes. 80Second, political competition increases the level of total 
expenditures in metropolitan municipalities regardless of the mayor’s partisan affiliation. It 
means that total expenditures do not suggest a particularistic spending policy for local 
governments with partisan ties with respect to political competition. Unlike the literature on 
                                                           
80 It should be noted that this research does not examine the discrepancies across the availability of resources to 
metropolitan municipalities with respect to their partisan affiliation. It only concerns the total expenditures a 
share of revenues. 
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budgetary choices, the results do not provide evidence of a decrease in total spending of 
mayors with partisan ties which might reduce the pressure on incumbents’ national budget.  
5. Conclusion 
This thesis examines the role of political variables in explaining variation across 
social expenditures of metropolitan municipalities in Turkey between 1997 and 2010. The 
budgetary analysis provides evidence to understand if incumbency affiliation in face of 
political competition leads local governments to strategically allocate their social 
expenditures. Moreover, electoral analysis examines whether mayors at the local elections 
and the political parties they are affiliated with at the national elections benefit from the 
strategic allocation of social spending.  
The findings of this thesis suggest that social spending decision of metropolitan 
municipalities might be affected by political variables of incumbency affiliation and political 
competition. The mayors that are affiliated with the national incumbents through partisan ties 
increase social transfers (before 2005) and spending on social assistance services (after 2006) 
in their stronghold provinces. In other words, local governments with partisan ties increase 
this particular type of spending in provinces where they have loyal voters. On the other hand, 
local governments that have partisan affiliation with national incumbents increase spending 
on health services particularly in face of political competition. The result suggests that the 
mayors with partisan ties target swing voters through health spending. Moreover, mayors that 
do not have partisan ties with incumbent government tend reward their loyal voters through 
social transfers and spending on social assistance services, similar to mayors that are 
affiliated with national incumbents. However, there is no evidence of a change in social 
spending decision for the mayors of opposition in competitive provinces. Accordingly; 
although incumbent affiliated mayors strategically allocate their resources on social 
expenditures, the mayors of opposition tend to spend more in their stronghold constituencies.  
The allocation of social expenditures at the local level does not have any significant 
impact on the vote share of mayors at the local elections. However, the spending decision of 
mayors reflects in vote share of the political parties they are affiliated with, for particular 
types of social spending at the national elections. The spending on social assistance that 
favors stronghold provinces increases the vote share of political parties at the national 
elections, regardless of the partisan affiliation of mayors. Moreover, AKP increases their vote 
share in the national elections by increasing health services at the local level, through 
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targeting competitive constituencies this time. The education spending of mayors that are 
affiliated with CHP or its predecessors might benefit those parties in national elections in 
terms of vote shares, although the mayors that are affiliated with CHP do not involve in 
strategic allocation of education expenditures for that matter.   
 There are two main conclusions from this research. First, local governments with 
partisan ties allocate different types of social expenditures strategically, with respect to the 
intensity of political competition at the local level. While mayors that are affiliated with 
national incumbents increase the spending on social assistance in their stronghold provinces, 
they allocate more resources on health spending in provinces where they encounter intense 
political competition. Both type of spending data are available after 2006 that covers the 
period of AKP government. Hence, it means AKP affiliated mayors increase spending on 
social assistance as well as spending on health services, with different motivations. Both 
types of social expenditures benefit AKP at the national elections. Second, although CHP 
seems to benefit from spending on education in national elections, the mayors of main 
opposition party do not involve in particularistic social spending. Accordingly, the CHP does 
not seem to prefer rational fiscal choices at the local governments, in terms of electoral 
outcomes.  
  Although the results imply strategic fiscal choices for national incumbents at the local 
level, further research is clearly needed to explain the particularistic linkages between the 
political parties and electorate. The surveys with recipients of social benefits (especially of 
social transfers and social assistance services) would enhance the interpretations of such an 
analysis. Further research through in depth interviews would strengthen the causal linkages 
between social spending decisions of local governments and political variables of interest. 
Unfortunately, due to time limitations this research only builds on statistical analysis of 
metropolitan municipalities’ final accounts and suggests that political determinants play a 
role in particularistic allocation of local resources with a focus on social expenditures. 
However, further research needs to be conducted to provide empirical support for the 







Figure 2. Descriptive statistics for dependent variable 
 Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Number of 
observations 
Social spending .00971 .0015378 .0066782 .0127419 207 
Social assistance .0204879 .0028232 .0147675 .0262083 38 
Health services .0213119 .0040132 .013255 .0293689 52 
Education 
services 
.0064853 .0014749 .0033867 .0095839 19 
 
Figure 3. Descriptive statistics for explanatory variable incumbency affiliation 
Incumbency 
affiliation 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
0 110 51.89 51.89 
1 102 48.11 100.00 
Total 212 100.00 - 
 
Figure 4. Descriptive statistics for explanatory variable political competition 










































































Table 1. The effect of incumbency affiliation on votes in national elections 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES AKP   
and its  
predecessors 
 
AKP   
and its  
predecessors 
year>=2002 
AKP   
and its  
predecessors 
year<2002 
CHP   




      
AKP lagged 0.61*** 0.49*** 0.85***   
 (0.100) (0.088) (0.057)   
AKP incumbency 0.12*** 0.09*** -0.00   
 (0.036) (0.029) (0.013)   
Banks per capita -0.64* -0.73*** 0.40 0.20 -0.26 
 (0.333) (0.249) (0.223) (0.132) (0.188) 
Change in banks per 
capita 
-2.09*** -0.09 -0.44 -2.11*** 2.29*** 
(0.546) (0.436) (0.713) (0.300) (0.401) 
Literacy rate 0.05 0.17 -0.13 0.09 0.46*** 
 (0.341) (0.451) (0.096) (0.103) (0.107) 
CHP lagged    1.00***  
    (0.074)  
CHP incumbency    0.01  
    (0.017)  
MHP lagged     0.36*** 
     (0.116) 
MHP incumbency     0.05 
     (0.044) 
Constant 0.15 0.15 0.05 -0.07 -0.29*** 
 (0.282) (0.381) (0.077) (0.083) (0.079) 
      
Observations 64 48 16 64 64 
R-squared 0.749 0.796 0.960 0.864 0.474 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 










Table 2. The effect of incumbency affiliation on votes in local elections 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES AKP   
and its  
predecessors 
 
AKP   
and its  
predecessors 
year<=2004 
AKP   
and its  
predecessors 
year>2004 
CHP   




      
AKP lagged 0.35*** 0.44*** 0.60***   
 (0.090) (0.128) (0.139)   
AKP incumbency 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.09**   
 (0.027) (0.034) (0.033)   
Banks per capita -0.65* -0.65 -0.71 0.61 -0.57* 
 (0.352) (0.476) (0.523) (0.438) (0.336) 
Change in banks per 
capita 
-2.29*** -2.81*** 1.40 1.81* 1.70*** 
(0.636) (0.872) (0.992) (0.911) (0.427) 
Literacy rate 0.05 0.07 0.34 -0.56 0.59** 
 (0.239) (0.297) (0.391) (0.673) (0.220) 
CHP lagged    0.53***  
    (0.133)  
CHP incumbency    0.17***  
    (0.059)  
MHP lagged     0.56*** 
     (0.152) 
MHP incumbency     0.17*** 
     (0.019) 
Constant 0.17 0.13 -0.14 0.50 -0.39** 
 (0.192) (0.233) (0.336) (0.573) (0.163) 
      
Observations 46 30 16 44 45 
R-squared 0.826 0.882 0.884 0.529 0.512 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 










Table 3. The effect of political variables on social transfers (1997-2005) 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) 
 year>2002 year <=2002 
    
Incumbency affiliation -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Competition 0.06*** 0.02 0.08*** 
 (0.017) (0.008) (0.013) 
Incumbency affiliation* 
Competition 
-0.03** -0.01 -0.02* 
(0.013) (0.008) (0.011) 
Population 0.33*** 0.26* 0.35*** 
 (0.015) (0.071) (0.020) 
Banks per capita 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.017) 
Literacy rate -0.02 -0.11* 0.01 
 (0.023) (0.031) (0.011) 
Ratio of old population 0.11* 0.18 0.16** 
 (0.053) (0.086) (0.056) 
District magnitude -0.17** -0.04 -0.23*** 
 (0.052) (0.039) (0.021) 
Constant 0.03* 0.09** 0.01 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.009) 
    
Observations 136 46 90 
R-squared 0.312 0.527 0.380 
Number of groups 16 16 15 
Driscoll and Kraay Standard errors in parentheses 












Table 3a. Fixed effect regressions on social transfers (1997-2005) 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) 
 year>2002 year <=2002 
    
incaff -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
competition 0.02 -0.05** 0.04* 
 (0.019) (0.010) (0.016) 
incumb_comp -0.00 0.03** 0.00 
 (0.017) (0.003) (0.013) 
population 1.40*** -0.13 0.58 
 (0.361) (0.680) (0.335) 
bankpercap 0.06 -0.49 -0.02 
 (0.057) (0.251) (0.024) 
literacy rate 0.26*** -0.11 0.42*** 
 (0.045) (0.247) (0.081) 
oldratio 0.13 0.93** -0.23 
 (0.101) (0.105) (0.183) 
DM -0.23*** 0.00 -0.20** 
 (0.054) (0.000) (0.061) 
Constant -0.24*** 0.11 -0.33*** 
 (0.041) (0.248) (0.065) 
    
Observations 136 46 90 
Number of groups 16 16 15 
Driscoll and Kraay Standard errors in parentheses 













Table 3.1. The effect of social transfers on the votes in national elections (1999 and 2002) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
 
AKP and its 
predecessors 
CHP and its 
predecessors 
MHP Independents 
     
Social transfers -1.72 -0.29 -0.14 -0.17 
 (1.185) (0.513) (0.870) (0.153) 
Banks per capita -0.62 0.53* -0.76* -0.02 
 (0.638) (0.309) (0.425) (0.069) 
Change in banks per capita -4.06*** -2.89*** 2.62*** -0.08 
 (1.044) (0.405) (0.767) (0.220) 
Literacy rate 0.15 -0.10 0.70*** 0.09 
 (0.245) (0.141) (0.212) (0.060) 
AKP lagged 0.56**    
 (0.267)    
AKP incumbency 0.07    
 (0.084)    
AKP*Social transfers 1.41    
 (5.688)    
CHP lagged  0.79*   
  (0.402)   
CHP incumbency  0.01   
  (0.026)   
CHP*Social transfers  1.46   
  (1.727)   
MHP lagged   0.13  
   (0.186)  
MHP incumbency   -4.42***  
   (0.463)  
MHP*Social transfers   7.73***  
   (0.797)  
Independent lagged    1.06*** 
    (0.068) 
Independent incumbency    -0.01 
    (0.034) 
Constant 0.07 0.08 -0.41** -0.08 
 (0.186) (0.105) (0.147) (0.052) 
     
Observations 31 31 31 15 
R-squared 0.679 0.750 0.572 0.998 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 






Table 3.2. The effect of social transfers on votes in local elections (1999 and 2004) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES AKP and its 
predecessor 
CHP and its 
predecessors 
MHP Independents 
     
Social transfers 0.18 -1.35 0.09 0.05 
 (1.345) (1.602) (1.018) (0.035) 
Banks per capita -0.68 0.52 -0.40 -0.02** 
 (0.463) (0.575) (0.428) (0.008) 
Change in banks per capita -2.78*** 1.66* 1.71*** 0.02 
 (0.815) (0.961) (0.498) (0.020) 
Literacy rate 0.09 -0.81 0.35 0.03 
 (0.303) (0.856) (0.283) (0.017) 
AKP lagged 0.43***    
 (0.121)    
AKP incumbency 0.20***    
 (0.062)    
AKP*Social transfers 0.15    
 (3.575)    
CHP lagged  0.29   
  (0.224)   
CHP incumbency  0.20   
  (0.135)   
CHP*Social transfers  0.28   
  (8.093)   
MHP lagged   0.48**  
   (0.198)  
MHP incumbency   0.19***  
   (0.039)  
Independent lagged    0.03*** 
    (0.004) 
Independent incumbency    -0.01*** 
    (0.003) 
Constant 0.12 0.75 -0.21 -0.02 
 (0.244) (0.720) (0.207) (0.015) 
     
Observations 30 29 29 13 
R-squared 0.882 0.472 0.641 0.891 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 







Table 4. The effect of political variables on social spending (2006-2010) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Social Spending Social 
Assistance 
Health Services Education 
Services 
     
Incumbency affiliation 0.03*** 0.01* 0.05** -0.01** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.004) 
Competition 0.13 0.12*** 0.12 0.03 
 (0.080) (0.025) (0.058) (0.022) 
Incumbency affiliation* 
Competition 
-0.15* -0.11** -0.21** -0.02 
(0.079) (0.025) (0.052) (0.013) 
Population 0.53** -0.63*** 0.35 -0.05 
 (0.168) (0.030) (0.191) (0.054) 
Banks per capita -0.14** 0.05 0.02 0.08* 
 (0.046) (0.027) (0.033) (0.029) 
Literacy rate 0.24* 0.01 0.25 0.11** 
 (0.109) (0.029) (0.132) (0.033) 
District magnitude -0.24** 0.56*** -0.56** 0.19** 
 (0.102) (0.025) (0.134) (0.065) 
Ratio of old population 0.06 0.11 -0.55*  
 (0.186) (0.053) (0.253)  
Ratio of young 
population 
   -0.08** 
    (0.022) 
Constant -0.19* -0.07* -0.14 -0.11** 
 (0.089) (0.027) (0.133) (0.034) 
     
Observations 113 38 52 19 
R-squared 0.232 0.800 0.461 0.790 
Number of groups 16 9 12 5 
Driscoll and Kraay Standard errors in parentheses 










Table 4a. Fixed effect regressions on social spending (2006-2010) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Social Spending Social 
Assistance 
Health Services Education 
Services 
     
Incumbency affiliation 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
Competition 0.01 0.13*** -0.04 0.30** 
 (0.051) (0.011) (0.034) (0.105) 
Incumbency affiliation* 
Competition 
0.02 -0.15*** 0.05 -0.22* 
(0.049) (0.010) (0.044) (0.083) 
Population 2.83** -1.19*** 0.19 -1.64** 
 (0.843) (0.247) (0.549) (0.581) 
Banks per capita 0.49** -0.04 -0.08 0.37** 
 (0.164) (0.088) (0.111) (0.124) 
Literacy rate 0.40** -0.13 -0.08 0.65** 
 (0.149) (0.117) (0.133) (0.212) 
District magnitude 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ratio of old population -0.31 0.16 -0.23**  
 (0.513) (0.109) (0.052)  
Ratio of young 
population 
   -0.62* 
   (0.235) 
Constant -0.44*** 0.16 0.11 -0.43** 
 (0.119) (0.109) (0.116) (0.136) 
     
Observations 113 38 52 19 
Number of groups 16 9 12 5 
Driscoll and Kraay Standard errors in parentheses 











Table 4.1. The effect of social spending on votes in national elections (2007 and 2011) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES AKP  CHP and its 
predecessors 
MHP Independents 
     
Social spending -1.10 0.14 -0.16 -0.13 
 (0.819) (0.106) (0.213) (0.073) 
Banks per capita 0.16 -0.21 0.08 -0.16** 
 (0.257) (0.126) (0.114) (0.053) 
Change in banks per capita 0.99 -0.76** 1.55*** 0.04 
 (0.679) (0.278) (0.359) (0.193) 
Literacy rate -0.39 0.46*** -0.07 0.03 
 (0.336) (0.140) (0.275) (0.158) 
AKP lagged 0.86***    
 (0.099)    
AKP incumbency -0.00    
 (0.035)    
AKP*Social spending 1.34    
 (0.843)    
CHP lagged  1.18***   
  (0.095)   
CHP incumbency  -0.01   
  (0.014)   
CHP*Social spending  0.35   
  (0.470)   
MHP lagged   0.75***  
   (0.195)  
MHP incumbency   0.00  
   (0.021)  
Independent lagged    1.35*** 
    (0.112) 
Independent incumbency    0.07 
    (0.045) 
Constant 0.47 -0.39*** 0.11 -0.00 
 (0.293) (0.120) (0.237) (0.141) 
     
Observations 27 27 27 11 
R-squared 0.933 0.979 0.753 1.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 







Table 4.2. The effect of social spending on votes in local elections (2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES AKP  CHP and its 
predecessors 
MHP Independents 
     
Social spending 0.97 -1.20 0.60 0.02 
 (1.081) (0.821) (1.670) (0.086) 
Banks per capita -0.36 1.66** -0.61 0.04 
 (0.220) (0.541) (0.649) (0.093) 
Change in banks per capita 1.26 -2.31 1.93 -0.21 
 (1.138) (2.352) (1.366) (0.163) 
Literacy rate -0.12 0.68 0.60 -0.01 
 (0.296) (0.550) (0.484) (0.091) 
AKP lagged 0.79***    
 (0.152)    
AKP incumbency 0.04    
 (0.050)    
AKP*Social spending 0.72    
 (1.050)    
CHP lagged  0.58**   
  (0.225)   
CHP incumbency  0.10   
  (0.118)   
CHP*Social spending  0.03   
  (3.189)   
MHP lagged   1.14***  
   (0.216)  
MHP incumbency   0.15***  
   (0.019)  
Independent lagged    -0.54 
    (1.435) 
Independent incumbency    -0.00 
    (0.011) 
Constant 0.15 -0.62 -0.43 0.01 
 (0.222) (0.458) (0.385) (0.083) 
     
Observations 14 13 14 12 
R-squared 0.962 0.968 0.730 0.430 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table 4.3. The effect of social assistance spending on votes in national elections (2007 and 
2011) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Incumbent AKP  CHP and its 
predecessors 
MHP Independents 
      
Incumbent vote lagged 0.85***     
 (0.115)     
Incumbency affiliation 0.08**     
 (0.037)     
Social assistance 3.34** -1.72 -0.29 -0.62** -0.02 
 (1.385) (1.862) (0.256) (0.270) (0.098) 
Incumbency affiliation* 
Social assistance 
-2.82*     
(1.363)     
Banks per capita -0.12 0.07 -0.09 0.11 -0.13 
 (0.266) (0.232) (0.137) (0.121) (0.076) 
Change in banks per capita 0.79 0.90 -0.87*** 1.46*** 0.14 
 (0.477) (0.696) (0.298) (0.337) (0.232) 
Literacy rate -0.35 -0.23 0.46*** -0.12 -0.06 
 (0.310) (0.391) (0.130) (0.252) (0.196) 
AKP lagged  0.81***    
  (0.108)    
AKP incumbency  0.02    
  (0.031)    
AKP*Social assistance  2.24    
  (1.935)    
CHP lagged   1.09***   
   (0.098)   
CHP incumbency   -0.00   
   (0.011)   
CHP*Social assistance   0.51   
   (0.948)   
MHP lagged    0.76***  
    (0.179)  
MHP incumbency    -0.01  
    (0.021)  
Independent lagged      1.40*** 
     (0.116) 
Independent incumbency     0.03 
     (0.046) 
Constant 0.38 0.33 -0.38*** 0.16 0.07 
 (0.272) (0.337) (0.115) (0.220) (0.176) 
      
Observations 24 27 27 27 11 
R-squared 0.959 0.927 0.978 0.774 0.999 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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   Table 4.4. The effect of social assistance spending on votes in local elections (2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES AKP  CHP and its 
predecessors 
MHP Independents 
     
Social assistance -0.28 -0.99 -1.29 0.04 
 (1.523) (0.983) (1.188) (0.083) 
Banks per capita -0.35 1.50* -0.64 0.05 
 (0.284) (0.587) (0.579) (0.102) 
Change in banks per capita 0.46 -1.79 1.40 -0.22 
 (0.909) (1.086) (0.752) (0.196) 
Literacy rate 0.17 0.37 0.97 -0.00 
 (0.228) (0.512) (0.801) (0.064) 
AKP lagged 0.55***    
 (0.113)    
AKP incumbency 0.08*    
 (0.034)    
AKP*Social assistance 2.29    
 (1.571)    
CHP lagged  0.63**   
  (0.214)   
CHP incumbency  0.11   
  (0.068)   
CHP*Social assistance  -1.01   
  (3.636)   
MHP lagged   1.14***  
   (0.239)  
MHP incumbency   0.12***  
   (0.031)  
Independent lagged     -0.48 
    (1.042) 
Independent incumbency    -0.00 
    (0.009) 
Constant -0.00 -0.36 -0.72 0.00 
 (0.166) (0.422) (0.631) (0.059) 
     
Observations 14 13 14 12 
R-squared 0.968 0.966 0.754 0.443 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 







Table 4.5. The effect of health spending on votes in national elections (2007 and 2011) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES AKP  CHP and its 
predecessors 
MHP Independents 
     
Health services -2.99*** 0.20* 0.02 -0.08 
 (1.006) (0.111) (0.155) (0.080) 
Banks per capita 0.09 -0.15 0.10 -0.15 
 (0.263) (0.118) (0.124) (0.074) 
Change in banks per capita 0.96 -0.78*** 1.61*** 0.13 
 (0.625) (0.270) (0.347) (0.207) 
Literacy rate -0.51* 0.44*** -0.11 -0.03 
 (0.271) (0.122) (0.291) (0.164) 
AKP lagged 0.88***    
 (0.108)    
AKP incumbency -0.02    
 (0.038)    
AKP*Health services 3.16***    
 (1.030)    
CHP lagged  1.16***   
  (0.081)   
CHP incumbency  -0.01   
  (0.017)   
CHP* Health services  1.28   
  (1.220)   
MHP lagged   0.81***  
   (0.206)  
MHP incumbency   -0.00  
   (0.023)  
Independent lagged    1.39*** 
    (0.116) 
Independent incumbency    0.04 
    (0.045) 
Constant 0.59** -0.38*** 0.13 0.05 
 (0.245) (0.106) (0.251) (0.146) 
     
Observations 27 27 27 11 
R-squared 0.946 0.981 0.747 1.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 







Table 4.6. The effect of health spending on votes in local elections (2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES AKP  CHP and its 
predecessors 
MHP Independents 
     
Health services -3.19 -0.21 2.60* -0.05 
 (7.876) (0.790) (1.332) (0.052) 
Banks per capita -0.43 1.53* -0.45 0.05 
 (0.488) (0.632) (0.378) (0.105) 
Change in banks per capita -0.07 -2.42 2.47** -0.26 
 (1.964) (1.803) (0.791) (0.228) 
Literacy rate 0.60 0.23 0.25 0.02 
 (1.151) (0.514) (0.472) (0.082) 
AKP lagged 0.65***    
 (0.120)    
AKP incumbency 0.05    
 (0.061)    
AKP*Health services 3.05    
 (6.675)    
CHP lagged  0.67**   
  (0.200)   
CHP incumbency  0.13   
  (0.073)   
CHP* Health services  -4.52   
  (5.902)   
MHP lagged   1.16***  
   (0.212)  
MHP incumbency   0.14***  
   (0.017)  
Independent lagged    -0.07 
    (1.136) 
Independent incumbency    0.00 
    (0.011) 
Constant -0.38 -0.26 -0.15 -0.02 
 (0.893) (0.427) (0.394) (0.077) 
     
Observations 14 13 14 12 
R-squared 0.925 0.957 0.830 0.441 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 







Table 4.7. The effect of education spending on votes in national elections (2007 and 2011) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES AKP  CHP and its 
predecessors 
MHP 
    
Education services 2.51 -0.46 -0.21 
 (1.860) (1.538) (1.754) 
Banks per capita 0.17 -0.19 0.12 
 (0.406) (0.166) (0.247) 
Change in banks per capita 1.11 -0.92*** 1.59*** 
 (0.883) (0.270) (0.406) 
Literacy rate -0.03 0.47*** -0.11 
 (0.532) (0.147) (0.291) 
AKP lagged 0.85***   
 (0.099)   
AKP incumbency 0.05   
 (0.040)   
AKP* Education services -4.82   
 (3.840)   
CHP lagged  1.16***  
  (0.073)  
CHP incumbency  -0.01  
  (0.010)  
CHP* Education services  3.34**  
  (1.366)  
MHP lagged   0.80*** 
   (0.192) 
MHP incumbency   -0.00 
   (0.021) 
Constant 0.10 -0.39*** 0.13 
 (0.463) (0.125) (0.253) 
    
Observations 27 27 27 
R-squared 0.921 0.981 0.747 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 









Table 4.8. The effect of education spending on votes in local elections (2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES AKP  CHP and its 
predecessors 
MHP Independents 
     
Education services 7.20 -5.70 -10.49 0.30 
 (11.538) (13.771) (16.722) (0.605) 
Banks per capita -0.64 2.28 0.55 0.01 
 (1.380) (1.570) (1.529) (0.092) 
Change in banks per capita 1.75 -2.56 -0.87 -0.16 
 (2.633) (3.617) (4.252) (0.240) 
Literacy rate 0.22 0.06 0.61 -0.01 
 (0.518) (0.546) (0.537) (0.062) 
AKP lagged 0.63***    
 (0.161)    
AKP incumbency 0.11**    
 (0.034)    
AKP* Education services -6.22    
 (4.816)    
CHP lagged  0.62**   
  (0.155)   
CHP incumbency  0.08   
  (0.051)   
CHP* Education services  0.49   
  (6.654)   
MHP lagged   1.11***  
   (0.243)  
MHP incumbency   0.11  
   (0.065)  
Independent lagged    -0.48 
    (0.824) 
Independent incumbency    -0.00 
    (0.008) 
Constant -0.07 -0.15 -0.49 0.01 
 (0.407) (0.406) (0.448) (0.056) 
     
Observations 14 13 14 12 
R-squared 0.931 0.958 0.736 0.434 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 











   
Incumbency affiliation -0.02 -0.04 
 (0.010) (0.052) 
Competition 0.29** -0.99** 





Population 2.08*** 1.64** 
 (0.446) (0.480) 
Banks per capita -0.76*** -0.35 
 (0.160) (0.246) 
Literacy rate -1.69*** -1.34*** 
 (0.091) (0.151) 
Partisan effect  -0.04** 
  (0.008) 
Constant 1.64*** 1.60*** 
 (0.098) (0.240) 
   
Observations 54 49 
R-squared 0.433 0.419 
Number of groups 12 11 
Driscoll and Kraay Standard errors in parentheses 













Table 5a. Fixed effect regressions on public welfare expenditures (2006-2010) 
 (2) (3) 
VARIABLES   
   
Incumbency affiliation 0.27*** 0.28*** 
 (0.005) (0.010) 
Competition 0.25 0.34 





Population -8.85 -10.88 
 (5.732) (6.921) 
Banks per capita 0.84 0.56 
 (0.470) (0.666) 
Literacy rate -0.28 -0.76 
 (0.337) (0.476) 
Partisan effect  0.03 
  (0.014) 
Constant 0.32 0.64 
 (0.359) (0.507) 
   
Observations 54 49 
Number of groups 12 11 
Driscoll and Kraay Standard errors in parentheses 













Table 6. The effect of political variables on total expenditures (1997-2010) 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) 
 year>2002 year>2002 
    
Incumbency affiliation 0.07** 0.11* 0.09** 
 (0.031) (0.048) (0.029) 
Competition 0.07 0.02 -0.11*** 
 (0.065) (0.186) (0.031) 
Incumbency affiliation* 
Competition 
-0.12* -0.16  
(0.068) (0.253)  
Population 7.14* 8.42* 8.46** 
 (3.311) (3.561) (3.524)  
Banks per capita -1.07** -0.80* -0.79* 
 (0.449) (0.367) (0.369) 
Literacy rate 0.03 -0.12 -0.22 
 (0.126) (0.281) (0.176) 
District magnitude -1.29** -1.34** -1.35** 
 (0.481) (0.419) (0.409) 
Constant 0.06 0.13 0.23 
 (0.108) (0.234) (0.130) 
    
Observations 203 113 113 
R-squared 0.414 0.542 0.541 
Number of groups 16 16 16 
Driscoll and Kraay Standard errors in parentheses 













Table 6a. Fixed effect regresssions on total expenditures (1997-2010) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES  year>2002 year>2002 
    
Incumbency affiliation 0.02 -0.09** -0.05* 
 (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) 
Competition -0.06 -0.18*** 0.04 
 (0.107) (0.033) (0.032) 
Incumbency affiliation* 
Competition 
-0.07 0.28***  
(0.113) (0.059)  
Population 36.37*** 75.96*** 74.93*** 
 (8.079) (13.037) (12.995) 
Banks per capita 2.06*** 0.47 0.55 
 (0.665) (0.483) (0.479) 
Literacy rate -0.25 -1.40** -1.31** 
 (0.242) (0.410) (0.423) 
District magnitude -4.35*** 0.00 0.00 
 (1.389) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.31 -0.62* -0.70* 
 (0.219) (0.306) (0.320) 
    
Observations 203 113 113 
Number of groups 16 16 16 
Driscoll and Kraay Standard errors in parentheses 
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